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ABSTRACT 
People around the world are mobilizing for constitutional change. This 
global phenomenon has been underexplored in comparative constitutional 
studies. This Article introduces the concept of constitutional mobilization, 
theorizes about it, and offers an original, empirical case-study.  
 First, it develops a general theoretical framework defined by the 
following key concepts. Constitutional mobilization is the process by which 
social actors employ constitutional norms and discourses to advocate for 
constitutional change. Constitutional opportunity refers to the general 
political and constitutional environment in which constitutional 
mobilization operates, and particular political and constitutional processes 
that provoke constitutional mobilization. Constitutional framing concerns 
identifying constitutional problems and proposing constitutional solutions, 
the process of which involves invocation of constitutional language, ideas, 
norms, or symbols presented in national constitutions, transnational 
constitutional law, and international law. Constitutional resources take the 
form of state actors who play the influential role in constitutional change. 
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And finally, constitutional change is understood as a multiple concept, 
which includes three types of change, namely revolutionary, reformative, 
and cultural. 
Second, this article develops a contextual theory to answer this question: 
under what conditions, how and why do social actors mobilize for 
constitutional change in authoritarian regime? The theory holds that, in an 
authoritarian regime, social actors seize the opportunity presented by 
constitution-making process to mobilize the public and also political 
leaders to engage in a popular, national constitutional dialogue, which 
results in reformative and cultural constitutional changes.  
Third, on that theoretical ground, this Article offers a case-study of 
Vietnam. This case-study has implications for China, which, like Vietnam, 
is also governed by a communist regime. However, as this article will 
demonstrate, China also presents significant constitutional divergences 
from Vietnam. More generally, this Article proposes establishing 
constitutional mobilization as a new area of empirical comparative 
constitutional inquiry based on case-studies exploration and contextual 
theorization.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss1/7
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INTRODUCTION 
Comparative constitutional scholarship has been dominated by the 
questions of how courts are structured and how they shape constitutional 
law. However, constitutional development is also driven by and responds to 
social mobilization. Several American scholars have accounted for the 
effects of social movements on constitutional law in the United States.1 Like 
in the United States, people around the world are mobilizing for social 
change, including constitutional change.2 Unfortunately, the emerging 
discipline of comparative constitutional law3 has largely neglected 
constitutional mobilization. This Article introduces this phenomenon and 
concept, theorizes about it, and offers an original case-study. 
First, this Article develops a general theoretical framework defined by 
the following key concepts. Constitutional mobilization is the process by 
which social actors employ constitutional norms and discourses to advocate 
for constitutional change. Constitutional opportunity refers to the general 
political and constitutional environments in which constitutional 
mobilization operates and to the particular political and constitutional 
processes that provoke constitutional mobilization. Constitutional framing 
concerns the process of identifying constitutional problems and proposing 
constitutional solutions and involves invocation of constitutional language, 
ideas, norms, or symbols presented in national constitutions, transnational 
constitutional law, and international law. Constitutional resource takes the 
form of state actors who play the influential role in constitutional change. 
Constitutional change is understood as multiple concepts which include 
three types of change: revolutionary, reformative, and cultural.  
 
 
1 Mark Tushnet, Social Movements and the Constitution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 241 (Mark Tushnet, et al eds., 2015); Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, 
and Social Movements, 111 MICH. L. REV. 877, (2013); JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, 
Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
1323 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, Constitutional Culture]; Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and 
the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001) [hereinafter 
Siegel, Text in Context]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and 
Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001) [hereinafter Eskridge, Jr., Channeling]; William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth 
Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002) [hereinafter Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects].  
2 See PAUL MASON, WHY IT’S KICKING OFF EVERYWHERE: THE NEW GLOBAL REVOLUTIONS 
(2012); CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998).  
3 For the revival of comparative constitutional law, see RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: 
THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2014); David Fontana, The Rise and Fall 
of Comparative Constitutional Law in the Postwar Era, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2011).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss1/7
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Second, this article develops a contextual theory to answer this question: 
Under what conditions, how, and why do social actors mobilize for 
constitutional change in authoritarian regime? The theory holds that, in an 
authoritarian regime, social actors seize the opportunity presented by the 
constitution-making process to mobilize the public and political leaders to 
engage in a popular, national constitutional dialogue, which results in 
reformative and cultural constitutional changes. 
Third, on that theoretical ground, this Article offers an original, 
empirical case-study of Vietnam. The Vietnamese case is intriguing. 
Vietnam is ruled by a communist party like China, but in many ways the 
Vietnamese are experimenting with constitutional law in ways that Chinese 
citizens cannot. Without necessary constitutional opportunity, despite the 
dynamics of the weiquan (right defence) movement,4 Chinese citizens 
cannot initiate a national constitutional dialogue as Vietnamese citizens did, 
although they have sometimes been able to appropriate other political 
opportunities to advocate for removing policies deemed to be 
unconstitutional.5 For example, constitutional activists, like Liu Xiaobo and 
the Charter 08 signatories, were able to advocate for their ideas but they 
were also met with serious punishment, harassment, and even faced 
detainment by the Chinese government.6 Also worth noting are the firm 
steps taken by the Chinese government in 2013 to quell the 
constitutionalism debate.7 In contrast, in 2013, Vietnamese citizens 
successfully seized the opportunity of constitution-making to mobilize a 
national constitutional dialogue, which resulted in reformative changes 
reflected in the new 2013 Constitution.8 These collective efforts were 
carried out by a coalition: a group of seventy-two intellectuals; law 
graduates; the “free citizens” group; the Cùng Viết Hiến pháp (Let’s Draw 
up the Constitution) group—an online forum providing constitutional 
 
 
4 For descriptions of the weiquan movement, see EVA PILS, CHINA’S HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS: 
ADVOCACY AND RESISTANCE (2014); JONATHAN BENNEY, DEFENDING RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY 
CHINA (2012); Hualing Fu & Richard Cullen, Weiquan (Rights Protection) Lawyering in an 
Authoritarian State: Building a Culture of Public-Interest Lawyering, 59 CHINA J. 111 (2008); Eva Pils, 
Asking the Tiger for His Skin: Rights Activism in China, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1209 (2006). 
5 See Mark Jia, China's Constitutional Entrepreneurs, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 619 (2016).  
6 On Charter 08 and the punishment of Liu Xiaobo, see LIU XIAOBO, CHARTER 08, AND THE 
CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA (Jean-Philippe Béja, et al eds., 2012) [hereinafter LIU 
XIAOBO].  
7 For examples of steps taken by the Chinese government in 2013 to quell the constitutionalism 
debate see Thomas E. Kellogg, Arguing Chinese Constitutionalism: The 2013 Constitutional Debate 
and the “Urgency” of Political Reform, 11 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 337 (2016); Rogier Creemers, China’s 
Constitutionalism Debate: Content, Context and Implications, 74 CHINA J. 91 (2015).  
8 See infra Part V and accompanying text. 
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analysis; the Vietnamese Catholic bishops; and civil society groups and 
organizations.9 The Vietnamese government not only tolerated the 
vehement constitutional mobilization but also engaged in an open (albeit 
controlled) constitutional dialogue with their citizens.10 The success of the 
Vietnamese people in reworking their constitution is notable, especially as 
Vietnam is a key player in the security and stability of Southeast Asia in 
general11 and their domestic constitutional politics may be viewed as an 
example for the region.  
This case-study is conducted on empirical grounds and with primary 
sources. I directly participated in the process of constitutional debates in 
Vietnam in early 2013 via several fora, such as official media events, 
conferences, and workshops, which enabled me to meet and exchange with 
constitutional intellectuals involved in mobilization, constitution-makers, 
and National Assembly delegates. Moreover, in January 2017, I interviewed 
social actors in Hanoi who had engaged in major constitutional 
mobilizations, members of the Constitutional Amendment Committee, 
members of the Editorial Board of Constitutional Amendment, Assembly 
deputies, and National Assembly officers.12 In addition, this case-study also 
relies on primary sources: written texts, speeches, and oral records of both 
social actors and state actors published in Vietnamese.  
This case-study has implications for China which shares with Vietnam a 
communist regime but presents significant constitutional divergence. More 
generally, this Article proposes establishing constitutional mobilization as 
a new area of empirical comparative constitutional inquiry based on case-
studies, exploration, and contextual theorization.  
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part II identifies 
constitutional mobilization as a global but understudied phenomenon. Part 
III develops a general theoretical framework. Part IV introduces the 
dialogical theory of constitutional mobilization under the specific condition 
of authoritarianism. Part V offers a descriptive exploration of the case of 
Vietnam and Part VI provides an explanatory analysis. Part VII concludes 
with general reflections.  
 
 
 
 
9 See infra Part V and accompanying text. 
10 See infra Part V and accompanying text. 
11 See ALAN COLLINS, THE SECURITY DILEMMAS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (2010).  
12 Due to the potential for retribution, interviewees referred to in this paper are kept anonymous, 
unless otherwise noted.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss1/7
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL MOBILIZATION: A LACUNA IN COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARSHIP  
On December 26, 2012, a group of seventy-two prominent Chinese 
scholars published a Reform Consensus Proposal, calling for constitutional 
change in China, on the grounds of “fundamental consensus on democracy, 
the rule of law, respect for human rights and other principles of 
constitutionalism demanded in a modern society.”13 The Proposal was 
echoed in the constitutionalism debate in the following year (2013), which 
“drew hundreds of participants, including academics, public intellectuals, 
journalists, rights activists, state-affiliated think tank researchers, and 
government officials.”14  
Coincidentally, on January 19, 2013, a group of seventy-two prominent 
Vietnamese intellectuals published a constitutional petition.15 This petition, 
however, was more radical and, ultimately, consequential. Now known as 
Petition 72, it advocated for more fundamental constitutional changes, 
including democratic and free elections, human rights consistent with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human 
rights treaties, private ownership of lands, the separation of powers among 
branches of the government and other forms of checks and balances, judicial 
independence, a constitutional court, a civil military, and referendum on the 
new Constitution.16 The group submitted the petition to the Constitutional 
Amendment Commission and then mobilized to obtain the signatures of 
14,000 Vietnamese people.17 This petition was the starting point of the 
vehement wave of civic activism in Vietnam in 2013, in which thousands 
of citizens, intellectuals, civil society groups and organizations advocated 
for constitutional change. 
The above stories illustrate a distinctive constitutional phenomenon 
which I call “constitutional mobilization.” Constitutional mobilization is a 
global phenomenon which occurs in various institutional settings including 
well-established democracies, new democracies, and authoritarian 
 
 
13 A Proposal for a Consensus about Reform, CHINA COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA (Dec 25, 2012, 
updated May 3, 2014), https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/12/25/a-proposal-for-a-
consensus-about-reform/.  
14 Kellogg, supra note 7, at 339-40.  
15 See infra Part V and accompanying text. 
16 See infra Part V and accompanying text.  
17 Kiến nghị về Sửa đổi Hiến pháp 1992 [Petitions on Amending the 1992 Constitution], BAUXITE 
VIETNAM (Apr. 14, 2013), http://boxitvn.blogspot.sg/2013/01/kien-nghi-ve-sua-oi-hien-phap-
1992.html. For detailed examination of this petition, see Bui Ngoc Son & Pip Nicholson, Activism and 
Popular Constitutionalism in Contemporary Vietnam, 42 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 667 (2016).  
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regimes.18 In the United States, “Jacksonianism, abolitionism, the labor 
movement, the second wave of American feminism, the Civil Rights 
movement, the gay rights movement, and the New Right” deployed 
constitutional litigation to mobilize for changes in judicial interpretations of 
the U.S. Constitution.19 Civic society has also involved in mobilizing 
constitutional change in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and South Pacific.20 
In Asia, in addition to the above Chinese and Vietnamese stories of 
constitutional mobilization, other recent stories of constitutional 
mobilization include Hong Kong’s 2013 Umbrella Movement mobilizing 
for direct election of the chief executive provided for in the Basic Law 
(Hong Kong’s mini-Constitution), Taiwan’s 2014 Sunflower Student 
Movement demanding to hold a citizens' constitutional conference to amend 
the Constitution, Japan’s 2015 protests against the new security law as 
unconstitutional, and South Korea’s 2015 protests which argued that the 
Anti-Sex Trade Laws were unconstitutional.21   
Constitutional mobilization is a global phenomenon but it is relatively 
understudied as a global phenomenon. Several American scholars have 
accounted for the role of popular constitutional mobilization in bringing 
about constitutional change in the United States, which reflects their own 
skepticism of the role of the judiciary in bringing about constitutional 
change in the United States.22 Examples of such scholars and their works 
 
 
18 For examples of global protests constituting what I refer to as constitutional mobilization in 
countries with forms of government from well-established democracies to new democracies and even 
authoritarian regimes, see generally MASON, supra note 2.  
19 Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (Or Fail To Change) the Constitution: The 
Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK L. REV. 27, 28 (2005). 
20 Paul Blokker, Constitutional Reform in Europe and Recourse to the People, in  
PARTICIPATORY CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: THE PEOPLE AS AMENDERS OF THE CONSTITUTION 31 (J. 
Gerkrath & X. Contiades eds., 2016); CIVIL SOCIETY AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN AFRICA 10 
(Tyanai Masiya & Charles Mutasa eds., 2014) [hereinafter CIVIL SOCIETY]; CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY: CASE STUDIES FROM SOUTHERN AND EAST AFRICA (Sylvia T. 
Panfil ed., 2012) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT]; Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, The Seeds 
of Change: Popular Protests as Constitutional Moments, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 363, 363-64 (2015); 
Virisila Buadromo, Fiji - The Constitutional Process: A View from the Fiji Women’s 
Rights Movement, 25 ACCORD 65 (2014).  
21  LIU XIAOBO, supra note 6; Albert H.Y. Chen, The Law and Politics of the Struggle for 
Universal Suffrage in Hong Kong, 2013–15, 3 ASIAN J. L. & SOC’Y 189 (2016); Brian Christopher 
Jones, Introduction, Focus: Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement, 45 H.K. L.J. 189 (2015); Craig Martin, The 
Legitimacy of Informal Constitutional Amendment and the "Reinterpretation" of Japan's War Powers, 
40 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 427, 485-6 (2017); Jee Heun Kahng, South Korea Prostitutes Decry Court 
Ruling, DemandRright to Work, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2016, 2:42 PM), 
http://in.reuters.com/article/southkorea-prostitution-
idINKCN0WX0XD?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews. 
22 NeJaime, supra note 1, at 885.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss1/7
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include Sanford Levinson's “Protestantism in constitutional interpretation;23 
Mark Tushnet’s24 and Larry Kramer’s25 theories of popular 
constitutionalism; Bruce Ackerman’s theory of dualist democracy;26 and 
Jack Balkin, Reva Siegel, and William Eskridge’s theories on social 
movements and constitutional change.27 However, these American scholars 
focus mainly on the domestic context and fail to consider the American 
experience in a globally comparative framework. This failure to consider 
the American constitutional experience in a global framework may, in part, 
be explained by the contention that in the U.S., “no social movement ever 
really cared about comparative constitutional law.”28  
Other comparative constitutional studies have largely ignored 
constitutional mobilization as a topic. This is firstly due to disciplinary 
balkanization: most works on social mobilization are conducted by 
sociologists and political scientists who deployed conceptual frameworks 
that are unfamiliar to legal scholars. 29 At the same time, sociologists and 
political scientists usually do not study phenomena of constitutional law 
because of “Talcott Parsons's distinction among the political (legal), 
economic, and social spheres.”30 To be sure, some law and society scholars, 
drawing on sociological and political science literature, do consider law, but 
tend to focus on ordinary legal mobilization rather than constitutional 
mobilization.31      
Apart from the disciplinary reason, the domination of the institutional, 
 
 
23 SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27 (1988).  
24 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (arguing against 
judicial review in favor of the role of the people in constitutional interpretation).  
25 LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (2004) (making the case for removing the final authority of constitutional review by the 
Supreme Court in favor of the final review by the people).  
26 See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 461-2 
(1989).  
27 See BALKIN supra note 1; Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 1; and Eskridge, Jr. Some 
Effects, supra note 1.  
28 Fontana, supra note 3, at 44-45.  
29 See Howard Stevenson, Challenging School Reform from Below: Is Leadership the Missing Link 
in Mobilization Theory?, 15 LEADERSHIP & POL’Y IN SCHS. 67 (2016); Timothy Ingalsbee, Resource 
and Action Mobilization Theories: The New Social-Psychological Research Agenda, 38 BERKELEY J. 
SOC. 139 (1993); Steven M. Buechler, Beyond Resource Mobilization? Emerging Trends in Social 
Movement Theory, 34 SOC. Q. 217 (1993). I am indebted to Professor Mark Tushnet for suggesting this 
disciplinary reason.  
30 Eskridge, Jr., Channeling, supra note 1, at 421.   
31 See Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L. J. 663 (2012); MICHAEL 
W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 
(1994); Frances Kahn Zemans, Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in the Political 
System, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 690 (1983). 
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juricentric approach32 in comparative constitutional inquiry has resulted in 
relative neglect of constitutional mobilization. Constitutional juricentrism is 
epistemologically connected to the assumption of the neutrality of 
constitutional law, which holds that constitutional law is produced by legal 
professionals through logical legal reasoning and is therefore neutral to 
politics and the society.33 While studies along these lines of thought have 
their own merits, they narrowly focus on a few jurisdictions which have 
effective judicial review systems34 and neglect the role of non-judicial 
actors in constitutional change.  
Moreover, the lack of studies on constitutional mobilization may have 
some connections to comparative constitutional textualism which focuses 
on the large-scale examination of national constitutional texts to identify 
global constitutional convergence.35 While textualists help introduce 
quantitative methods into comparative constitutional studies, they have yet 
to account for texts in socially contested contexts. The language of 
constitutional texts may look similar but how constitutional language is 
invoked and contested in social reality may be different.  
In addition, the relative neglect of constitutional mobilization in 
comparative constitutional inquiry is due to practical reasons. Constitutional 
mobilization both shapes and is shaped by social complexity, the 
complicated interactions of national culture, politics, intellectual 
environment, ideology, social structure, and economic conditions. An 
appropriate understanding of this social complexity requires local 
knowledge and even necessary engagement into the local society, which 
may present difficulties to global constitutionalists.  
That said, some constitutional theorists do consider the social context of 
constitutional law. For example, the theory of “societal constitutionalism” 
has accounted for social control exercised outside the governmental 
 
 
32 For recent work discussing the impact of the institutional, juricentric approach to explaining 
constitutional change, see VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL 
ERA (2013); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: CONTESTED POWER IN THE ERA OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS (2015); CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH: THE ACTIVIST 
TRIBUNALS OF INDIA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND COLOMBIA (Daniel Bonilla Maldonado ed., 2013); and PO 
JEN YAP, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE IN COMMON LAW ASIA (2015). 
33 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1959).  
34 See THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: TEXTS, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS (Steven Calabresi et al. eds., 2016) (focusing on the fifteen constitutional democracies in 
the G-20 Nations).  
35 See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 
99 CALIF. L. REV. 1163 (2011) and David S. Law, Constitutional Archetypes, 95 TEX. L. R. 153 
(2016).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss1/7
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sphere.36 However, it largely ignores social mobilization, and focuses 
mainly on the social control imposed by private organizations and 
institutions, which reflects the adherence to the conventional institutional 
approach to constitutionalism.37 Another example is the theory of “political 
constitutionalism” drawing from the republican tradition in the United 
Kingdom.38 But, political constitutionalists have concentrated on political 
institutions rather than social mobilization. Some scholars who consider the 
social and political foundations of the constitutions39 and 
constitutionalism40 have yet to substantively discuss the relation of social 
mobilization. 
II. A GENERAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
A. Constitutional Mobilization.  
I define constitutional mobilization as the process by which social actors 
invoke constitutional norms and discourses to advocate for constitutional 
change. It is a form of social mobilization which involves social actors, such 
as human rights activists, intellectuals, constitutional law scholars, lawyers, 
and civil society groups and organizations. Constitutional mobilization is 
also a form of legal mobilization as it concerns law, legal institutions, and 
legal processes. However, it is a distinctive phenomenon, different from 
other forms of social and legal mobilization. To conceptualize its distinctive 
features, I extend into the constitutional realm three theories on social 
mobilization and social movements developed by political scientists and 
 
 
36 DAVID SCIULLI, THEORY OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: FOUNDATIONS OF A NON-
MARXIST CRITICAL THEORY 16 (1992).    
37 Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centered Constitutional 
Theory?, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 
2004). Some rare work on societal constitutionalism does refer to social movements but focus on 
transnational settings. See Gavin W. Anderson, Societal Constitutionalism, Social Movements, and 
Constitutionalism from Below, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 881 (2013). 
38 RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY (2007).  
39 Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg,Theoretical Perspectives on the Social and Political 
Foundations of Constitutions, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 4 (Denis J. 
Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013); CHRIS THORNHILL, A SOCIOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONS: 
CONSTITUTIONS AND STATE LEGITIMACY IN HISTORICAL-SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 5 (2011).  
40 See Wen-Chen Chang, East Asian Foundations for Constitutionalism: Three Models 
Reconstructed, 3 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 111 (2008).  
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sociologists, namely political opportunity, framing, and resource 
mobilization.41  
B. Constitutional Opportunity. 
The political opportunities theory focuses on “the broader political 
system in structuring the opportunities for collective actions and the extent 
and form of same.”42 In explaining the emergence of a particular social 
mobilization or a social movement, this theory accounts for “changes in the 
institutional structure or informal power relations of a given national 
political system.”43 Works on political opportunities also “account for cross-
national differences in the structure, extent, and success of comparable 
movements on the basis of differences in the political characteristics of the 
nation states in which they are embedded.”44  With that base, constitutional 
opportunities refers to the general political and constitutional environment 
in which constitutional mobilization occurs, and particular political and 
constitutional processes that provoke constitutional mobilization.  
In the United States, constitutional mobilization is shaped by a general 
environment of liberal constitutional structure characterized by the 
separation of powers, checks and balances, and a strong guarantee for civil 
liberty, especially the freedoms of speech, thought, association, and press. 
This structure is connected to the tradition of enlightenment liberalism, 
especially its core ideas of limited government and liberal rights 
protection.45 This overall American constitutional structure is also culturally 
and morally associated with the Christian tradition that values individual 
freedom.46 
American constitutional theorists tend to focus on courts as the particular 
constitutional environment for the operation of social mobilization.47 
 
 
41 David S. Meyer, Protest and Political Opportunities, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 125 (2004); David A. 
Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation, 51 AM. SOC. 
REV. 464 (1986); J. Craig Jenkins, Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements, 
9 ANN. REV. SOC. 527 (1983). 
42 Doug McAdam et al., Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing 
Processes – Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements, in COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND 
CULTURAL FRAMINGS 1, 2 (Doug McAdam et al. eds., 1996).   
43 Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). 
44 Id. 
45 See ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, LL.D., THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
(2007).  
46 See generally H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (1993).  
47 See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects, supra note 1, at 2066-67.  
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American courts are the environment conducive to social mobilization 
because their judicial process is relatively open compared to the political 
process, judicial independence is guaranteed within that environment, and 
the political and ideological composition of the federal judiciary is 
flexible.48 
The thesis of judicial opportunity resonates in some institutional settings 
where the judicial review power is relatively effectively exercised by 
supreme courts or specialist constitutional courts. For example, in Brazil, 
India, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan, actors of social movements 
also appropriate the process of judicial review to mobilize for constitutional 
change.49  
However, in other institutional settings where judicial institution is weak 
or politically dependent, social actors may seize other important 
constitutional opportunities. Stephen Ellmann, in discussing activist 
lawyers in the third world, argues that “courts are not the only governmental 
forum with which lawyers can work.”50 Maria Akchurin also indicates that 
environmentalist lawyers and activists in Ecuador appropriate the process 
of the constitutional assembly to mobilize the right of nature, which lead to 
a constitutional adoption of this right.51 In particular, as constitution-making 
and constitutional amendments are the prevailing feature in the countries 
which are struggling to transition into a more constitutionalist regime, they 
create important constitutional opportunity for constitutional mobilization, 
as is evident in Kenya, South Africa, Somalia, Zambia, Zanzibar, and 
Zimbabwe. 52  
C. Constitutional Framing.  
The framing theory is directed to the “conscious strategic efforts by 
 
 
48 NeJaime, supra note 1, at 900.  
49 See TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: COMPARING THE APEX COURTS OF BRAZIL, 
INDIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA (Oscar Vilhena et al. eds., 2013) (particularly chapters 22, 23, and 24); Ki-
young Shin, The Politics of the Family Law Reform Movement in Contemporary Korea: A Contentious 
Space for Gender and the Nation, 11 J. KOREAN STUD. 93 (2006); Chang-Ling Huang, Civil Society 
and the Politics of Engagement, in TAIWAN’S DEMOCRACY CHALLENGED: THE CHEN SHUI-BIAN 
YEARS 195, 199 (Yun-han Chu et al. eds., 2016).  
50 Stephen Ellmann, Cause Lawyering in the Third Word, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL 
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 349, 366 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold 
eds., 1998). 
51 Maria Akchurin, Constructing the Rights of Nature: Constitutional Reform, Mobilization, and 
Environmental Protection in Ecuador, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 937 (2015). 
52 CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 20. See also CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 20.  
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groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of 
themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.”53 Frames are 
conditioned by the circumstances that make people “feel both aggrieved 
about some aspect of their lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, they 
can redress the problem.”54 Framing, therefore, involves identifying 
problems, exposing responsible actors, and proposing solutions.55 Scholars 
also identify several aspects of frames, including ideas, sentiments, identity, 
culture, and strategies.56  
On that ground, constitutional framing involves identifying 
constitutional problems and suggesting constitutional solutions. 
Constitutional frames are conditioned by people’s grievance about the 
existing constitutional system and their demand for constitutional change. 
To frame constitutional arguments and demands, social actors refer to 
distinctive constitutional language, ideas, norms, or symbols, which 
include: (1) fundamental constitutional principles (such as, the separation 
of power and judicial independence); (2) constitutional rights (which is to 
say a social actor’s general understanding of constitutional rights, principles 
of constitutional rights like proportionality, and specific constitutional 
rights); (3) constitutional institutions (the legislature, the executive, and the 
judiciary); (4) and constitutional procedures (such as judicial review and 
constitutional referendum). 57 
American constitutional theorists argue that, “[The [U.S.] Constitution 
offers resonant frames for social movement actors.”58 Such theorists focus 
exclusively on the domestic frame, which stems from the fact that the 
Warren Court focused exclusively on domestic law.59  
The idea that social actors deploy the existing constitution to frame 
constitutional arguments and mobilize for constitutional change also 
resonates elsewhere. To illustrate, consider the case in which women 
movement actors in South Korea relied on the existing constitution to frame 
constitutional arguments and mobilize to abolish the Korea’s family head 
system (hoju chedo). The practice of Hoju chedo, as stipulated in South 
Korea’s Civil Code, subordinated women’s rights and status to the male 
 
 
53 McAdam et al., supra note 42, at 6 (emphasis in original).  
54 Id. at 5.  
55 Nejaime, supra note 1, at 892.  
56 McAdam, et al, supra note 42, at 5.  
57 For general constitutional language and ideas, see DIETER GRIMM, CONSTITUTIONALISM: PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE (2016).  
58 Nejaime, supra note 1, at 892.  
59 Fontana, supra note 3, at 45-6.  
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head of the family.60 In contrast to the conservative calling for “respecting 
the tradition,” women movement actors mobilized for “respecting the 
Constitution,” which means to respect the constitutional provisions on equal 
rights, human dignity, and gender equality.61 Movement actors instituted 
litigation challenging the constitutionality of the family head system. With 
the support of the Alliance and Lawyers for a Democracy Society, some 
members of The Citizens’ Alliance for the Abolishment of the Family-Head 
System, which had been founded through the efforts of 113 women’s 
organizations, filed several appeals to local courts in Seoul in 2001 
challenging the constitutionality of relevant articles in the Civil Code.62 The 
appeals were transferred to the Constitutional Court for judicial review. In 
February 2005, the Court decided the family head system was 
unconstitutional, which effectively led to its abolishment in the revised Civil 
Code.63 This case suggests that the women movement actors invoked the 
existing Constitution to frame their argument, and to demand equal rights 
and gender equality in South Korea.  
In other contexts, mobilizing actors do not merely frame their arguments 
based on the existing constitution. There is a growing scholarship on the 
globalization of constitutional law, in which scholars discuss the social 
forces (such as lawyers and investors) of constitutional globalization.64 This 
literature, however, has yet to consider the fact that social actors often 
employ international law and transnational constitutional law to mobilize 
for constitutional change. The force of globalization diffuses constitutional 
ideas embodied in international treaties, especially international human 
rights laws, and in foreign constitutional texts, to all corners of the globe. 
Social actors in the developing world are motivated by these global 
constitutional ideas and mobilize for domestic constitutional change in line 
with the global values, which contribute to the process of constitutional 
globalization.65 In addition, transnational social movements, transnational 
NGOs66 and transnational networks focusing on global constitutional issues 
 
 
60 Shin, supra note 49, at 113.  
61 Id. at 100.  
62 Hyunah Yang, Colonialism and Patriarchy: Where the Korea Family-Head (Hoju) System had 
been Located, in LAW AND SOCIETY IN KOREA 51 (Hyunah Yang ed. 2013). 
63 Id. at 52.  
64 David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 1277, 
1317 (2008); Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 985, 
991, 993 (2009).  
65 See generally BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009). 
66 BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL 
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like IDEA,67 inspire and support domestic social actors to mobilize for 
realization of global constitutional values in the local context. In addition, 
the revival of the law and development movement also contributes to the 
spread of legal knowledge including knowledge about the constitutional 
experience of established constitutional democracy in the developing 
world.68 Together, these various international influential parties, sources of 
inspiration, and means of sharing ideas about drafting constitutions come 
together to shape the process of constitutional framing on a global scale.  
Consequently, in the developing world, not only existing constitutional 
text but also international instruments and transnational constitutional 
sources offer ideas, norms, and symbols for social actors to frame 
constitutional arguments and mobilize for constitutional change. In 
particular, when developing nations are struggling for formal constitutional 
reform, the existing constitution offers the frame for social actors to address 
internal problems to the existing constitutional order while international 
instruments and foreign constitutional texts offer sources for social actors 
to frame constitutional solutions.  
Yet, a sense of nationalism, exceptionalism, and community identity 
may result in frame alignment, frame amplifying, and extending frames.69 
Constitutional alignment, a term which I have created, refers to the 
connection and integration of transnational and national sources in framing 
constitutional arguments. In amplifying frame, social actors may present 
and underline specific constitutional values which may connect to their 
specific identity. Conversely, in extending frames, social actors connect 
their identity-base constitutional arguments to the broader national picture 
to draw wider public support.  
D. Constitutional Resources.  
Resource mobilization theory depicts mobilizing actors as rational actors 
who are able to gain the support of external resources for fixed 
goals.70Scholars identify different types of resources, including financial, 
rhetorical, institutional, and “human” resources.71 Social actors mobilizing 
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67 See IDEA INT’L, https://www.idea.int/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2017).  
68 See generally PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD : IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE (Thomas 
Carothers ed., 2006).  
69 Nejaime, supra note 1, at 893.  
70 Jenkins, supra note 41, at 529. 
71 Id. at 533.  
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for constitutional change also need these resources. However, constitutional 
mobilization requires distinctively constitutional resources in the form of 
state actors who will play an influential role in constitutional change. 
Constitutional mobilizers need to garner the support from these actors to 
achieve their constitutional goals.   
Constitutional resources refer to what Balkin labels as “nodes of power 
and influence” who “determine which ideas and positions ascend into 
plausibility and dominance and which are cast into the dustbin of history.”72 
In American constitutional culture, the “nodes of power and influence” are 
those who have the judicial review power, namely judges. Consequently, 
social actors would approach them as mobilization resource.73  
The idea that judicial elites are the resource for constitutional 
mobilization is reflected in the institutional settings where judges can 
influence constitutional change through their judicial review power. For 
example, in May 2005, civil members of the Taiwan Cabinet Commission 
on the Promotion of Human Rights requested the cabinet to stop “the soon-
to-be-implemented policy of requiring fingerprints for the state ID card.”74 
Civic members argue that “the fingerprint requirement was unconstitutional 
a and violation of citizen’s rights: it would contribute little to reducing crime 
rates but would carry great risks of identity theft for citizens.”75 One of the 
civic members, Peter Huang, created the activist group called Citizen’s 
Alliance Against the Fingerprint Requirement, which worked with social 
movements organizations.76 Among other strategies, such as threatening to 
resign, writing pieces to oppose the policy, and holding conferences, Huang 
managed to prosecute his argument before the constitutional court.77 He 
persuaded legislators from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party to 
request an interpretation from the Taiwan’s Constitutional Court. Then, on 
June 19, 2005, the Court declared the policy as unconstitutional, effectively 
striking down the fingerprint requirement.78  
But, in many other contexts, constitutional judges are not the 
mobilization resource. For example, actors of the Sunflower Movement 
approached legislators rather judges to demand for constitutional change. In 
new democracies where courts have constitutional roles, courts are often 
 
 
72 BALKIN, supra note 1, at 182-3.  
73 Nejaime, supra note 1, at 897-9.  
74 Huang, supra note 49, at 199.  
75 Id. at 209.  
76 Id. at 199 
77 Id.  
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attacked by political elites.79 In these cases, social actors will turn to political 
rather than judicial actors as “nodes of power and influence”80 to garner 
support of their constitutional goals. For example, social movement actors 
in Egypt focused on members of the constituent assembly to demand for 
change of constitutional process and substance.81In the developing world 
especially, courts are often weak, politically controlled, incompetent, and 
lack pubic trust, which prevents them from playing constitutional roles.82  In 
such context, social actors will approach political elites as mobilization 
resources who in turn impact the scope, agenda, and strategies and goal of 
constitutional mobilization. 
E. Constitutional Change.  
In constitutional mobilization, social actors advocate for constitutional 
change. Constitutional changes must be understood as a concept with 
multiple incarnations, which include different types of change, namely 
cultural, reformative, and revolutionary. Cultural changes concern the 
change in the constitutional understanding, behavior, attitude, and 
consciousness of different social and state actors. Reformative changes refer 
to the incremental changes within the existing constitutional order. 
Revolutionary change concerns the creation of a new constitutional order.83 
Constitutional mobilization does not always result in constitutional change. 
Such mobilizations may fail or succeed. Also, the degree to which it may 
succeed will vary, as an episode of constitutional mobilization may create 
either minor or major changes.  
In the United States, due to the extreme difficulty of formal 
constitutional change, 84 constitutional change primarily means the change 
in courts’ understanding of the Constitution’s meaning. Siegel calls this the 
 
 
79 Stephen Gardbaum, Are Strong Constitutional Courts Always a Good Thing for New 
Democracies?, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285 (2015).  
80  BALKIN, supra note 1, at 182.  
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82 See Julius Court, et al., The Judiciary and Governance in 16 Developing Countries 1, (United 
Nations University, World Governance Survey, Working Paper No. 9, 2003).  
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change in constitutional culture or the networks of understandings and 
practices that structure our constitutional tradition.85 This practice is also 
reflected elsewhere. For example, as the case of South Korea described 
above illustrated, the women’s movement actors sought to change courts’ 
understanding of the constitutional meaning of equality and dignity in order 
to effect constitutional change.86  
But the practice wherein social actors seek to change the judicial 
understanding of the constitution as a means of effecting constitutional 
change is not prevalent in places where constitutional meanings are not 
defined by the courts either because those courts do not have the 
constitutional interpretation power (such as in China and Vietnam) or this 
power is limited. For example, in Japan where judicial review is limited, the 
power to interpret the Constitution is vested to the Government, particularly 
its Cabinet Legislation Bureau.87 On July 1, 2014, the government of Japan 
issued a decision reinterpreting Article 9 of the Constitution to allow the 
Japanese use of force overseas “in the event of an armed attack against a 
foreign country that has a close relationship with Japan.”88 Thousands of 
people protested, seeking to prevent the Japanese government’s 
constitutional reinterpretation.89 
Moreover, social actors seek to change not only the understanding of the 
existing constitution but also the process for conducting formal 
constitutional changes. Unlike in the U.S., in the last three decades formal 
constitution-making has been highly dynamic in the developing world as a 
component of the larger project of state-building. 90 In this case, social actors 
will focus on mobilizing for formal constitutional change.91 Particularly 
during the period of transition from an authoritarian regime into a 
democracy, the language of a nation’s constitution is often fluid and formal 
constitutional change occurs more often.92 In such a context, mobilizing 
 
 
85 Siegel, Text in Context, supra note 1, at 303.  
86 Yang, supra note 62, at 100.  
87 Kensuke Ueda, Reinterpreting Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, THE CONSTITUTION UNIT, 
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88 Id.  
89 Euan McKirdy, Japan Split as Nation Mulls End of Pacifism, CNN (July 2, 2014), 
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90 JOANNE WALLIS, CONSTITUTION MAKING DURING STATE BUILDING (2014). Around 100 new 
constitutions have been put in place since the fall of the Berlin Wall. See Cheryl Saunders, Constitution-
Making in 21st Century, 1 INTL. REV. L. 1, 2 (2012). 
91 See, e.g., the actions of Egyptian social actors as described in Badr & Ghali, supra note 81. 
92 On the unstable nature of constitutional transition, see Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: 
The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009 (1997).  
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actors will often seek to effect formal constitutional change. For example, 
during the June Democracy Movement in 1987, the South Korean coalition 
of social movement organizations “agreed upon the importance of 
constitutional revision as a movement goal and a tool for consensus 
mobilization.”93 Even in relatively established democracies, social actors 
also sometimes struggle for formal constitutional change as a means of 
strengthening democratic aspects of government. An example of this sort of 
effort was the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan. One of the Sunflower 
Movement’s demands was for a formal constitutional change in order to 
secure “the equivalent of a constitutional Bill of Rights”94 which would 
include “detailed provisions to protect basic human and social rights from 
discrimination or infringement by the state and substantive abrogation by 
government-business collusion.”95 
III. A DIALOGICAL THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL MOBILIZATION 
Social mobilization as well as constitutional law may have transnational 
dimensions, but each is deeply shaped by contextual factors: institutional 
settings, intellectual environment, ideology, political culture, and social-
economic conditions. Therefore, there may not be a universal theory about 
constitutional mobilization. Alternatively, I suggest pluralizing the 
theorization of this phenomenon with close attention paid to the local 
context.96 In particular, the contextual theorization must be sensitive to the 
difference of social mobilization for constitutional change in different 
political regimes. With this in mind, in this section I elaborate a dialogical 
theory of constitutional mobilization under authoritarian regime. 
Meticulous case-studies can be a method to overcome the challenges in 
comparative constitutional law concerning the complexity of local context 
and constitutional interdependence. Therefore, I will offer a Vietnamese 
case-study to illustrate the dialogical theory in the next part.  
Under what conditions, how, and why do social actors mobilize for 
constitutional change in authoritarian regime? The term “authoritarian 
 
 
93 Chulhee Chung, Mesomobilization and the June Uprising: Strategic and Cultural Integration 
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regime” refers to a political regime featuring centralized power (whether by 
person, military, or party), limited civil liberty, and the suppression of social 
mobilization.97 Given the suppressive nature of an authoritarian regime, the 
normal intuition is that constitutional mobilization cannot happen under 
such a regime. My theory, however, is that, under an authoritarian regime, 
the constitution-making process offers a particular constitutional 
opportunity for social actors to mobilize the public and political leaders to 
engage in a national, popular constitutional dialogue, which often results in 
reformative and cultural constitutional changes.  
The language of dialogue is prevailing in contemporary constitutional 
theory. Dialogical constitutional theories have been developed on the 
grounds of constitutional experience in the United States, Commonwealth 
nations, and common law Asia.98 The existing dialogical constitutional 
theories have a narrow focus on constitutional dialogue triggered by the 
practice of judicial review power. Constitutional dialogue is manifested in 
three different forms:99 (1) national institutional dialogues or the dialogues 
between courts and political institutions about constitutionality;100 (2) 
transnational judicial dialogues or dialogues between supreme courts and 
constitutional courts in different countries about the content and process of 
constitutional decision-making;101 and (3) public, national constitutional 
dialogues. The existing dialogical constitutional theories fail to appreciate 
the possibility of a broader, public national constitutional dialogue. 
Especially, when focusing on dialogical judicial review, scholars have 
largely ignored the possibility of constitutional dialogue without judicial 
review. Moreover, constitutional mobilization has virtually disappeared in 
the existing dialogical constitutional scholarship, which mainly stems from 
the domination of comparative constitutional juris-centrism. Consequently, 
scholars fail to recognize the possibility of constitutional mobilization in 
triggering constitutional dialogue. I suggest an extension to popular, 
national constitutional dialogue in which the mobilized public engages in a 
conversation with political leaders to exchange ideas, opinions, and discuss 
 
 
97 For a comprehensive study of authoritarianism, see JUAN J. LINZ, TOTALITARIAN AND 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (2000).  
98 Mark Tushnet, Dialogic Judicial Review, 61 ARK. L. REV. 205, 208-10 (2008); ALISON L. 
YOUNG, DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE AND THE CONSTITUTION 173 (2017); YAP, supra note 32.  
99 I thank Tom Ginsburg for his suggestion of these three manifestations of constitutional dialogue.  
100 On this form, see, e.g., Kent Roach, Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the 
Supreme Court and Canadian Legislatures, 80 CANADIAN BAR REV. 481 (2001).  
101 On this form, see, e.g., David S. Law and Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Global Judicial 
Dialogue, 86 WASHINGTON L. REVIEW 523 (2011).  
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constitutional questions.  
A. Dialogical Opportunity.  
Recent scholarship on the role of courts in authoritarian regimes seems 
optimistic about judicial empowerment, arguing that courts provide an 
environment for social actors to challenge authoritarian states.102 But, this 
argument relies mainly on the role of courts in providing forum for activists 
to challenge ordinary law or governmental policies. When it comes to the 
constitutional level, courts are less relevant mainly because the 
constitutional role of courts in authoritarian regimes is more limited than 
their role in ordinary legal matters. Although social actors may occasionally 
deploy the courtroom when there is an opportunity, generally, judicial 
process is not the main opportunity for social actors to mobilize for 
constitutional change under authoritarian regimes.  
Alternatively, formal constitutional process, especially constitution-
making, creates an important opportunity for the operation of constitutional 
mobilization under authoritarian regimes. This is because constitution-
making is normally a critical moment touching on fundamentals of a polity. 
Moreover, the constitution-making process is usually open and inclusive, 
which draws the attention and participation of a wide range of social and 
state actors. But, as this process has multiple steps (including agenda-
setting, drafting, state deliberation, public deliberation, ratification) 
mobilizing actors need to choose the right moment to address their 
constitutional concerns. For example, it is too early to address constitutional 
concerns during the initial steps of setting an agenda, when the constitution-
makers have just produced a first constitutional draft, or when that draft is 
discussed within the institutional circle. It is also too late to address 
constitutional concerns when the constitution-makers are about to approve 
the new constitution. The most suitable moment to address constitutional 
concerns is when the regime releases the draft constitution for public 
deliberation. Social actors ought to seize this moment to mobilize a national 
constitutional dialogue.  
To a certain extent, the particular environment of formal constitutional 
process must be accompanied by the regime’s willingness to permit the 
political control of civil liberty. The overall constitutional structure and 
politics of an authoritarian regime is not conducive to social mobilization, 
but, in response to social and political complexity, an authoritarian regime 
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may soften their suppression of civil liberty by, perhaps, allowing the public 
discussion of constitutional issues which  would permit a constitutional 
environment to exist wherein social actors may be able to mobilize a 
national constitutional dialogue while a formal constitutional change 
process is underway. 
B. Dialogical Frame.  
Scholars have pointed out that constitutions in authoritarian states 
operate as manuals, billboards, blueprints, and window dressing.103 Yet, 
authoritarian constitutions have another function: they operate as the 
mobilizing frame. It functions as the frame for social actors to identify 
constitutional problems internal to the existing authoritarian regime and 
mobilize for constitutional change. To develop arguments for constitutional 
changes, social actors will turn to alternative sources, including 
transnational sources. International treaties and foreign constitutions 
operate as the frames for social actors to formulate arguments for 
constitutional change. But, a sense of nationalism and community identity 
contextualize global and transnational frames, which results in the 
dialogical interaction between global and local frames. This dialogical 
framing also allows social actors to draw the public support, to avoid 
political punishment, and to consolidate the legitimacy of their 
constitutional arguments.  
Three dialogical strategies104 in constitutional framing are also applied. 
First, social actors align transnational constitutional discourse with some 
unfilled language in the existing constitutional text and in the authoritarian 
elite’s constitutional rhetoric. For example, even authoritarian constitutions 
and leaders employ language like “democracy,” “rule of law,” or “human 
rights” and social actors working for change in such nations use that 
language to argue that their actions aren’t in contrast to the existing 
constitution but, rather, that they are merely seeking to realize the existing 
constitution’s original language.105 The framing space is noticeably wider 
when the existing constitution and constitutional rhetoric embrace 
ambiguous and contradictory language. Second, social actors amplify 
specific constitutional values. As an example of such amplification in an 
 
 
103 Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN 
REGIMES 2 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, eds., 2013). 
104 NeJaime, supra note 1, at 893. 
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authoritarian context, social actors may focus on specific features of the 
authoritarian regime like single-party rule or political ideology. Such 
identity-based mobilization may also underline specific values. For 
example, as I will discuss later in this Article, Vietnamese gay activists 
focused on the constitutional protection of freedom of marriage as a means 
of advocating for their desired changes.106 Third, to engage in a national 
constitutional dialogue, social actors need to extend their specific concerns 
to general, national concerns. For example, social actors may connect their 
specific grievances against the government to general concerns of the 
population such as free elections or political competition. As I will discuss 
later in this Article, an example of this behavior was when Vietnamese gay 
activists connected their concerns about gay rights to more general human 
rights in order to gain more popular support and legitimacy for their pursuit 
of gay rights.107 
C. Dialogical Resource 
The constitutional resources in the authoritarian regimes are political 
elites rather than judicial elites. They are the forces to have the final say on 
constitutional issues. Therefore, social actors will approach them as 
mobilization resource using dialogical strategy.   
Law and society scholars have pointed out that activists mobilizing 
under authoritarian conditions “avoid strategies and tactics common under 
liberal democratic conditions, such as marches or open and structured 
association.”108 They try to avoid “direct confrontation with the state, or 
being seen as a threat to existing arrangements of power.”109 To survive, 
social actors mobilizing constitutional change under authoritarian condition 
also need to adopt a dialogical rather than confrontational approach. They 
also try to avoid confrontational methods like demonstrating or organizing 
oppositional bodies. They instead adopt dialogical means to communicate 
with the public and with political leaders. But, unlike actors mobilizing 
ordinary legal reform, actors mobilizing constitutional change inevitably 
directly challenge the existing constitutional arrangement and those in 
power. The adherence to the formal constitutional change process initiated 
by the existing regime and to constitutional rhetoric adopted by those in 
 
 
106 See infra part VI.B and accompanying text. 
107 See infra part VI.B and accompanying text. 
108 Lynette J. Chua, Pragmatic Resistance, Law, and Social Movements in Authoritarian States: 
The Case of Gay Collective Action in Singapore, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 713, 719 (2012). 
109 Id. at 722.  
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power is a survival strategy on the part of an applicable authoritarian regime. 
The government may initiate counter-mobilization against the constitutional 
mobilization. State actors, however, would not suppress but engage in a 
dialogue with social actors and the public at large. 
D. Dialogical Constitutional Change.  
The consequence of a constitutional mobilization under an authoritarian 
regime is determined by the nature of authoritarian institutional settings and 
the balance of power between authoritarian leaders and social forces. When 
authoritarian leaders are powerful and social forces are weak, constitutional 
mobilization would not lead to a revolutionary constitutional change. In this 
context, social actors as rational actors would not be naïve enough to force 
authoritarian leaders to give up their power and change the regime in a 
violent and revolutionary way. The more likely expected consequence is a 
national constitutional dialogue which leads to reformative and cultural 
constitutional change. 
 
IV. EXPLORATORY DESCRIPTION  
A. Background.  
Under communist rule, Vietnam experienced five constitutions 
promulgated in 1946, 1959, 1980, 1992, and most recently 2013.110 Despite 
its authoritarian conditions, constitutional mobilization is evident in the 
modern constitutional history of Vietnam. During the authoritarian rule of 
the French colonists in the early twentieth century, public intellectuals and 
their organizations actively mobilized for creation of a constitutional 
government in Vietnam defined by western features such as a written 
constitution, popular sovereignty, liberal rights, and the separation of 
powers.111 When the communist regime dominated North Vietnam, a 
striking social movement called Nhân Văn Giai Phẩm emerged in the late 
1950s, mobilizing for democratization and constitutional protection of the 
 
 
110 See MARK SIDEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF VIETNAM: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 27, 45, 67, 83 
(2009). For the 2013 Constitution, see Pip Nicholson, Vietnamese Constitutionalism: The Reform 
Possibilities, 11 ASIAN. J. COMP. L. 199, 200 (2016).  
111 See generally PHAN ĐĂNG THANH, TƯ TƯỞNG LẬP HIẾN VIỆT NAM NỬA ĐẦU THẾ KỶ 20 
[VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHTS IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY] 
(2006). 
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freedom of speech, which they ultimately successfully enshrined in the 1946 
Constitution.112 After the national unification in 1975, protestors continued 
to demonstrate against their government’s misuse of public power and 
advocated for the protection of citizens’ rights.113  
Most striking is the recent explosion of constitutional mobilization 
during the process of making the 2013 Constitution. On August 4, 2011, the 
National Assembly of Vietnam (NA) decided to comprehensively revise the 
1992 constitution in response to domestic “renovation” and international 
integration.114 From January 2 to March 31, 2013, the NA released a draft 
of a new constitution (rather than constitutional amendments) to the public 
for comment. This draft retained substantial features of the socialist 
constitutional system, including the leadership of the Communist Party and 
state ownership of all lands. It also removed the right to free primary 
education, eliminated the leading role of the state-owned sector, introduced 
a provision restricting human rights for common goods, pronounced the 
military’s loyalty to the Communist Party, and created an advisory 
constitutional council.115 
During the constitutional consultation process, constitutional 
intellectuals, activists, social groups and organizations vehemently opposed 
the draft version of the Constitution and started to engage in constitutional 
mobilization.116 Below I describe this mobilization on chronological base.  
B. Petition 72. 
This petition for fundamental constitutional change has been examined 
in detail elsewhere117 so a short summary will suffice here. On February 4, 
2013, Dr Nguyễn Đình Lộc, a constitutional law scholar and former 
Minister of Justice, submitted what came to be known as Petition 72 to 
Vietnam’s Constitutional Amendment Committee. Constitution-makers 
responded to the group with a written statement saying that their petition 
 
 
112 Peter Zinoman, Nhân Văn—Giai Phẩm and Vietnamese ‘Reform Communism’ in the 1950s: A 
Revisionist Interpretation, J. COLD WAR STUD., Winter 2011, at 60.  
113 This includes in the 1997 Thái Bình protests and the more recent 2012 Tiên Lãng and Văn 
Giang protests. For more details, see Toan Le, Perspectives on Land Grabs in Vietnam, in LAND GRABS 
IN ASIA: WHAT ROLE FOR THE LAW? 150 (Connie Carter & Andrew Harding eds., 2015).  
114 Interview with a member of the Constitutional Amendment Committee in Hanoi (Jan. 13, 
2017) [hereinafter, Constitutional Amendment Committee Interview].  
115 See Bui Ngoc Son, Contextualizing the Global Constitution-Making Process: The Case of 
Vietnam, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 931948-9 (2016).  
116 For a short report on this, see Bui Ngoc Son & Pip Nicholson, Vietnam Moves Cautiously on 
Constitutional Reform, ASIAN CURRENTS (Jun. 15, 2015), http://asaa.asn.au/vietnam-moves-
cautiously-on-constitutional-reform/.  
117 Son & Nicholson, supra note 17.  
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would be considered equally as other submissions. Eventually, in late 2013, 
when a new constitution was adopted without substantive changes, the 
group released an open statement calling for it to be boycotted.118  
Petition 72 drew wide public attention.119 Mr Nguyễn Quang A, a human 
rights activist and a key member of the 72 group, explained their purpose as 
constituting the following [translated from the original Vietnamese 
quotation]: “In fact, at the beginning of the year, when Petition 72 was 
initiated, the initiators did not establish a main goal that the delegates of 
the National Assembly will understand and change or they will make a 
constitution which is really a constitution… Its chief aim is to initiate a 
learning movement, a movement among the entire people, especially among 
the young people, a movement for debating, studying, and discussing the 
Constitution... If there are some changes among the National Assembly or 
the authorities, this will be welcomed, but this outcome is only 
supplementary.”120 Thus, the main goal of the 72 group was to trigger a 
national constitutional dialogue. In fact, Petition 72 had a strong influence 
on the subsequent constitutional mobilization and debate in Vietnam in 
2013.  
C. “Let’s Draw up the Constitution.” 
The founding members of the group called Let’s Draw up the 
Constitution were Ngô Bảo Châu, a Vietnamese-French mathematician at 
the University of Chicago, who received the Fields Medal in 2010, Đàm 
Thanh Sơn, a Vietnamese physicist also at the University of Chicago, and 
Nguyễn Anh Tuấn, an associate scholar of the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government at Harvard University and former Editor-in-Chief of 
Vietnamnet, one of the most popular official online media in Vietnam. The 
group was then joined by Bùi Đức Lại, a retired party-member and scholar, 
Nguyễn Ái Cần, a lawyer in the United States, and three legal scholars from 
Vietnam National University-Hanoi School of Law, namely Nguyễn Đăng 
Dung, Vũ Công Giao, and Trần Kiên. The group widely drew the attention 
 
 
118 Id. at 692, 696.  
119 Thichhoctoan, Thông báo của nhóm soạn thảo và ký kiến nghị 72 về sửa đổi Hiến pháp 
[Announcement of the Group drafting and signing Petition 72 on Amending the Constitution], CÙNG 
VIẾT HIẾN PHÁP (April 17, 2013), https://hienphap.wordpress.com/2013/04/17/thong-bao-cua-nhom-
soan-thao-va-ky-kien-nghi-72-ve-sua-doi-hien-phap/.    
120 Thách báo nhà nước tranh luận về HP [Daring the State Media to Debate on the 
Constitution], BBC (Nov. 18, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam/2013/11/131117_vn_constitution_petition72_aims.  
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of the Vietnamese public and intellectuals mainly thanks to the reputation 
of the founding members.  
On February 1, 2013, one day before the state formally realized the draft 
constitution for public consultation, this group created a website called 
Cùng Viết Hiến pháp (hereinafter, CVHP), for which the group has this 
name.121 The group was aware that “the Draft Amendment to the 1992 
Constitution has drawn wide attention among the people.”122 The group 
therefore seized this opportunity to introduce their activity.123  
The group’s work included three components: creating a forum for 
constitutional dialogue, providing a means of digesting public opinion on 
the draft constitution, and offering constitutional suggestions.  
First, CVHP created a forum for a constitutional dialogue, which was 
their primary goal.124 The group attempted to create a dialogical space for 
all those concerned with the constitutional revision to discuss this topic 
seriously and democratically.125 The group believed that a democratic 
dialogue about constitutional revision is the initial step which will facilitate 
further straightforward dialogue on the building up the rule of law in 
Vietnam.126 It is important to point out that no such similar public platform 
existed in Vietnam, aside from the official government website through 
which citizens can submit formal comments.  
The CVHP published different constitutions in Vietnamese history, 
different drafts of the revised constitution including the draft officially 
released by the state and alternative draft proposed by constitutional 
activists like the 72 group, writings on foreign constitutions, and some 
writings on constitutional theory, and comments on the draft constitutions 
prepared by the constitution-makers. The CVHP focused on the most 
controversial issues of constitutional revision which are divided into seven 
themes: the party leadership, human rights and citizen rights, control and 
separation of powers, land ownership and state-owned economic sectors, 
constitution-making and referendum, constitutional review, and others.  
Pursuant to the commitment to create an open forum, the CVHP 
 
 
121 See the website of the group here: CVHP, https://cungviethienphap.wordpress.com/ (last 
visited March 2, 2018). I frequently contributed papers to this forum during the constitution-making 
process. Through this, I closely observed the activity of the group and maintained connections with the 
group members. To conduct this study, I further interviewed and had informal conversations with some 
of them.  
122 Id.  
123 Interview with a member of the CVHP group in Hanoi. (Jan. 15, 2017) [hereinafter CVHP 
Interview].  
124 Id.  
125 CVHP, supra note 121.   
126 Id.  
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published writings by a variety of authors, ranging from established legal 
scholars, especially constitutional law scholars, lawyers, officials, 
politicians, and journalists to ordinary people and dissidents inside and 
outside of Vietnam. CVHP’s purpose in doing this was to disseminate 
diverse positions and opinions on contentious constitutional issues.127 Some 
writings are extremely liberal, while the others are extremely conservative. 
Some writings strongly argue for a multi-party system rooted in western 
liberal ideas, while the others strongly defended the exclusive role of the 
leadership of the Communist Party grounded in the conventional 
justifications of historic victory. The CVHP also amassed and published the 
writings from a wide range of sources, ranging from the party outlets to 
dissidents’ blogs, personal blogs, and foreign websites. It is the only forum 
of this kind tolerated by the government. Many radical, dissident writings 
can be freely accessed in this website, but the same writings were blocked 
in other forums. The regime possibly tolerated this forum because of the 
reputation of the founding members, and because the CVHP group was 
balanced and neutral in its publication of a wide range of materials.  
Second, CVHP also conducted an online survey on public opinion on the 
draft constitution.128 The data of the survey was collected from March 1-20, 
2013, with 3122 people responding. 60% of the Internet protocol addresses 
were from Vietnam, while the others were from forty other nations. This 
suggests that the Vietnamese diaspora and Vietnam watchers were able to 
access to the forum, which enabled them to engage in the constitutional 
dialogue from afar. The result is as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127 CVHP Interview, supra note 123.  
128 The result and the group’s analysis are available at: A - Thông tin về người tham gia khảo sát 
[Information about Participants in the Survey], 
https://hienphap.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/phantich.pdf (last visited March 2, 2018). 
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Table 1: CVHP’s Online Survey on Public Opinion on the Draft 
Constitution129 
 
Questions No Yes No Opinion 
Other No 
Answer Note Opinions 
Should 
Vietnamese 
be 
established as 
the national 
language? 
14.9 76.9 4.2 1.6 2.4 All 
14.6 77.2 3.9 0.9 2.4 Only Vietnam 
 
The survey of the group intentionally focused on the most controversial 
issues which were bitterly debated during the constitutional consultation 
process. Several issues had been raised in Petition 72. The CVHP group 
employed mathematician techniques to analyze the result of their survey, 
which was meant to reach to objective observations.130 The group made 
three observations. First, there is a very high consensus (around 89-95%) on 
the concepts of rejecting the military’s loyalty to the Communist Party, 
ensuring judicial independence, providing for the separation of powers, 
creating a body of constitutional review, and holding referendum on the new 
constitution. Second, there is a less agreement (around 80-86%) on the 
concepts of removing the provision on the leadership of the Communist 
Party, removing the provision on collective ownership of lands, and 
removing the provision on human rights restrictions. Third, there even more 
divergence regarding non-ideological questions, such as those dealing with 
the adoption of a constitutional described national language and providing 
for free and compulsory primary education.131  
The online survey serves as an empirical base for CVHP to offer 
constitutional suggestions, their third activity. To prepare for the 
constitutional proposal, members of the group contentiously discussed 
before they could reach certain agreements.132 The group then submitted 
their constitutional proposal to the Constitutional Amendment Committee 
 
 
129 Id. The first line in the Note indicates all answers while the second line indicates only answers 
from Vietnam. The original questionnaire and results are in Vietnamese. I have provided the translation 
of the original Vietnamese writing for the results presented here.  
130 CVHP Interview, supra note 123.  
131 [Information about Participants in the Survey], supra note 128.  
132 Id.  
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via regular mail,133 and published it on the group’s website.134 The group 
wanted to have dialogue with the constitution-makers, and so they 
purposely offered “constructive” suggestions135 to minimize the risk of 
offending the Constitutional Amendment Committee.  
On these grounds, the group’s submission rejected the new provision 
stipulating the military’s loyalty to the Communist Party because this 
provision may cause “mistakes in recognition and actions” and unnecessary 
contestations, rejected the provision on Vietnamese as the national language 
because such provision may cause conflicts among nationalities, and 
rejected the provision on human rights restrictions because this provision 
may be misused to violate human rights.136 The group proposed retaining 
the provision on compulsory and free primary education since this has 
worked effectively in the past. In addition, the group supported removing 
the provision on the leading role of the state-owned economic sector and 
establishing multi-ownership of lands because the state’s ownership of all 
lands is inconsistent with the market rules and is the root of corruption and 
serious social conflicts. The group also proposed creating a constitutional 
council with definitive judicial review power rather than having review 
powers invested in an advisory council.137 The above suggestions are 
consistent with the popular opinion indicated in the group’s online survey.  
The group took a nuanced position on highly the contentious Article 4 
of the draft Constitution, which affirmed the leadership of the Communist 
Party. The group contended that the first incorporation of Article 4 on the 
leading of the Communist Party in the 1980 Constitution is not necessary, 
but this constitutional establishment is a historical reality. In the current 
situation, the group believed, the elimination of Article 4 will result in 
unanticipated consequences regarding the stable development of the 
nation.138 The group did not explicitly support retaining this Article but 
stated that if Article 4 is retained, it should be amended by recognizing that 
the leadership of the Communist Party is vested by the people through free 
elections and therefore subjected to the people’s supervision and control. 
The group proposed that the Constitution should not provide for the class 
 
 
133 Id. 
134 CVHP, Đề xuất sửa đổi, bổ sung một số quy định của Dự thảo Hiến pháp sửa đổi năm 2013 
[Suggestions on Amending, and Supplementing some Provisions of the Draft revised Constitution of 
2013], https://hienphap.wordpress.com/de-xuat/.  
135 CVHP Interview, supra note 123.  
136 Id.  
137 Id.  
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nature and ideology (Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh’s thoughts) of 
the Party because these areas are outside the scope of the Constitution and 
properly belong to another document—the charter of the Communist Party.  
The CVHP’s constitutional suggestions drew the public attention and 
were subjected to controversial discussions and criticisms in online media, 
especially its last suggestion regarding the Party’s leadership.139 Some 
criticize this suggestion as being illogical because free elections cannot 
coexist with the constitutional confirmation of the leadership of the Party 
while the others agree that this is a weak solution in the current situation.140 
After the NA adopted the new constitution on November 28, 2013, the 
CVHP group released a farewell statement, stating that they completed their 
mission but that the new constitution was completely different from the 
suggestions made by the group and from the majority opinion of the 
audiences.141 Constitution-makers did not officially respond to the specific 
constitutional proposals of the CVHP group. Rather, the constitution-
makers maintained that they had received, studied, and treated all 
constitutional submissions equally.142 However, informal conversations 
suggest that constitution-makers had a positive response to the CVHP’s 
constitutional submission, mainly because the group’s submission was 
“constructive,”143 which means that they did not oppose the existing regime 
by, for example, calling for multi-party system.  
Accordingly, the CVHP group successfully seized the opportunity of 
constitution-making to mobilize a constitutional dialogue. In regard to their 
main concern of a constitutional dialogue, they were much more successful. 
The group in fact had an “implicit constitutional dialogue” with the 
government. They sent their suggestions to the constitution-makers and 
political leaders who implicitly positively responded. More importantly, the 
group successfully created a wide space for open constitutional dialogue 
among the public and intellectuals on controversial and sensitive 
constitutional questions and, as a consequence of their careful and sensitive 
approach, their dialogue was ultimately tolerated by the government. In this 
 
 
139 See, Nhóm Cùng Viết Hiến Pháp gửi đề xuất [the CVHP Group Releases the Suggestions], 
BBC TIENG VIET (Apr. 6, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam/2013/04/130406_cvhp_proposal.  
140 See, e.g., Lê Diễn Đức, Giáo sư Ngô Bảo Châu đi trật đường rầy? [Professor Ngô Bảo Châu 
Run off the Rail], RFA (Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/ReadersOpinions/ngo-
bao-chau-ldd-04082013-04082013121533.html.    
141 Trankien2013, CVHP (Nov. 28, 2013), Lời Tạm biệt [Farewell Statement],  
https://hienphap.wordpress.com/2013/11/28/loi-tam-biet-cung-viet-hien-phap/.  
142 Interview with an Assembly deputy in Hanoi. (Jan. 12, 2017).  
143 CVHP Interview, supra note 123.  
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sense, the CVHP group was more successful than the Petition 72 group. The 
reputation of the founding members of the CVHP group and its the focus on 
creating an impartial space for dialogue rather than taking tough stands on 
sensitive constitutional issues like question of admitting a multi-party 
system explains their success.  
D. Petition of The Alumni of the Hanoi Law University 
On February 21, 2013, nine alumni of the Hanoi Law University, one of 
the largest law schools in Vietnam, published the “Petition for the 
Amendment of the 1992 Constitution” (hereinafter, Law Alumni 
Petition).144 They believed that law graduates play an important role in the 
development of constitutionalism. They wrote: “More than ever, 
Vietnamese law students and graduates, whether they are inside and outside 
Vietnam, whether they graduated from any law schools in the world, are 
facing great opportunity and responsibility. Great in building the 
fundamental foundation of the Vietnamese legal system..”145 So, the law 
graduates appropriated the opportunity of the constitution-making process 
to mobilize the engagement of law students in constitutional change. The 
petition was circulated on the Internet, including on the blog of the 72 group. 
The law alumni also created a website to collect supporting signatures.146 
They mobilized support from law students and law graduates from different 
law schools throughout Vietnam and law schools located overseas.  
Trịnh Hữu Long, one of the initiators of the law graduates’ petition, 
stated that the purpose of this petition was to make a voice with professional 
quality to this circle of constitutional revision [paraphrased].147 The Law 
Alumni Petition focuses on two points concerning not the substantial but 
rather the procedural aspects of constitution-making. First, they called for 
removing the deadline for public constitutional consultation (from January 
2 to March 31, 2013). They argued that the deadline assumes that 
constitutional suggestions and comments beyond this limited period would 
 
 
144 Heinphap, Thư ngỏ và Kiến nghị về Việc Sửa đổi Hiến pháp của Cựu Sinh Viên Luật Hà nội 
[Hanoi Law Graduates’ Open Letter and Petition Concening Constitutional Revision] (Feb. 24, 2013),   
https://hienphap.wordpress.com/2013/02/24/thu-ngo-va-kien-nghi-ve-viec-sua-doi-hien-phap-cua-
cuu-sinh-vien-luat-ha-noi/.   
145 Id.  
146 The website used the following url which has since been deleted: http://hienphap.kiennghi.net/.  
147 Sinh viên luật kiến nghị sửa đổi Hiến pháp [Law Students Petition for Constitutional Revision], 
BBC (Feb. 25, 2013, 3:57 GMT), 
http://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/mobile/vietnam/2013/02/130225_law_students_constitution.shtml.  
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not be considered, which is contrary to the concept that the constitution-
making power belongs to the people. Accordingly, the Law Alumni Petition 
argued for the people to have the legitimate right to discuss the draft 
constitution until they believed that the draft met with their will and 
aspirations.148 
Second, the Law Alumni Petition called for popular ratification of the 
new Constitution in a national referendum. To justify this argument, the law 
alumni cited to the first constitution of Vietnam enacted in 1946, which 
provided for constitutional referendum. This provision was abolished by the 
subsequent constitutions. In addition, the Law Alumni also stated that a 
constitutional referendum was preferable because it would be consistent 
with the popular practices with regards to promulgating constitutions as 
practiced by members of the international community.149 So, both the 
national constitutional legacy and foreign constitutional experience invoked 
the call for constitutional referendum. The Law Alumni also invoked social 
contract theory to consolidate the theoretical underpinning of their petition. 
They argued that because the constitution is the social contract between the 
people and the state, the people are the true authors of the constitution and 
the constitution must be ratified by the people in a national referendum.150 
Importantly, the fact that the existing constitution (the 1992 Constitution) 
does not provide for popular ratification does not limit the practice of 
constitutional referendum because this is a “natural right” of the people.151 
They also stressed that the 1992 Constitution’s provisions which allowed 
the National Assembly to possess the constitution-making power as part of 
their ordinary legislative powers was inconsistent with the principle of 
popular sovereignty confirmed in the same document.152 Accordingly, the 
law graduates used the existing constitution as the base for articulating the 
constitutional problems they alleged to be internal to the existing regime.  
Ultimately, the Law Alumni Petition did not advance new petitions but 
consolidated the two points found in the Petition 72 concerning the 
constitution-making process. The limitation of the petition to these two 
points indicates that the law graduates were more concerned with 
mobilization for expanding the space for constitutional dialogue than they 
were with effecting substantive constitutional change.  
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150 Id.  
151 Id.  
152 Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
2018]    CONSTITUTIONAL MOBILIZATION       147 
 
 
 
 
E. “Declaration of Free Citizens.” 
The “Declaration of Free Citizens” released on February 28, 2013 is the 
consequential impact of Petition 72. In a speech at the meeting with the Vĩnh 
Phúc Province Party’s Standing Committee on February 25, 2013, General 
Secretary of the Communist Party Nguyễn Phú Trọng denounced the 
constitutional petitions for multi-party, depoliticization of the army, and 
separation of powers, and implicitly referred to the Petition 72 group as 
“political, ideological, and moral deterioration.”153 In response, a junior 
journalist of the state-owned Family & Society Newspaper (Báo Gia đình 
& Xã hội) named Nguyễn Đắc Kiên wrote an article on February 25, 2013 
in which he overtly criticized the General Secretary. This article was first 
published in his personal blog and then disseminated in different blogs, 
websites, and Facebook.154  
Kiên stated that the General Secretary has no legitimate status to speak 
to the people in such a manner. He made three criticisms on the General 
Secretary’s statement. First, he argued that the provisions of the proposed 
constitution maintaining the sole leadership of the Communist Party, the 
loyalty of the armed forces to the Party, and the rejection of the separation 
of powers of government expressed the will of the Party and of the General 
Secretary rather than the general will of the Vietnamese people.155 Second, 
he argued that communist morality does not necessarily reflect Vietnamese 
traditional moral values.156 Third, he argued that communist political 
ideology is not a truism.157  
He then “declared” his aspirations for constitutional change, including a 
constitutional convention like that in Philadelphia to draft a new constitution 
that would provide for a multi-party system, civil military, separation of 
powers, the autonomy of local governments, and the abolition of state-
owned national conglomerates. These aspirations resonated with 
fundamental features of liberal constitutionalism, especially American 
constitutionalism.  Kiên eventually emphasized that by declaring his 
 
 
153 This statement was reported in a television news broadcast and is available at: Tổng Bí thư 
Nguyễn Phú Trọng làm việc tại Vĩnh Phúc, YOUTUBE (Feb. 25 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jYf64ISHo3k.  
154 See Nguyễn Đắc Kiên, Vài lời với TBT ĐCS VN Nguyễn Phú Trọng [Some Words to General 
Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng], CVHP, https://hienphap.wordpress.com/2013/02/26/vai-loi-voi-tbt-
dcs-vn-nguyen-phu-trong-nguyen-dac-kien/.  
155 Id.  
156 Id.  
157 Id.  
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aspirations, he was affirming his natural human rights to freedom of speech 
and freedom of thoughts. 158  
Kiên was fired the following day for “violating the rules of the 
Newspaper and labor contract,” which was announced on the website of the 
Family & Society Newspaper.159 In an ordinary situation, he might have 
been arrested or jailed, not merely lost his job, for defamation and 
subversive actions as he dared to denounce the highest political leader and 
called for fundamental change of the regime. However, perhaps thanks to 
the publicized, extraordinary opportunity of constitution-making wherein 
there was a mass engagement in critical dialogue with Party leadership, he 
was allowed to retain his freedom. 
In an interview with the Vietnamese branch of the Radio France 
Internationale, Kiên further explained his activism.160 He said that his action 
was the consequence of his long awareness of civil rights, and the General 
Secretary’s speech had motivated him to write the article. He said he was 
not surprised to lose his job and had already prepared for any consequences. 
He was ultimately more concerned with the public awareness: “I am ready 
to receive any consequences, but I hope everyone in our country, from the 
people to the leaders, will be aware of the openness to accept different 
opinions.”161 When asked about his message to the public, Kiên said: 
“Everyone should be patient as everyone knows that democratization is a 
long process and we should not be hasty…I believe that my action is very 
normal in a country which has a liberal democracy. Of course, I hope we 
will be hands in hands to promote a liberal democracy in the country of 
Vietnam.”162 Kiên was, accordingly, realistic in his approach. As he believed 
that democratization requires long-term effort, his main goal was to express 
his awareness of liberal rights and therefore to raise the public awareness of 
rights and political pluralism, rather than to demand for immediate radical 
constitutional change. 
Kiên’s audacious action drew wide public attention. This is firstly 
because he publicly criticized a top political leader. The fact that a junior 
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reporter working for state-owned media caustically and publicly denounced 
and flouted a dignitary like the General Secretary is unusual in an 
authoritarian environment like that in Vietnam. Secondly, his actions drew 
attention because his constitutional assertions were even stronger than those 
made in Petition 72, the release of which touched the most sensitive nerves 
of the regime. While the 72 group called for free elections, which implied a 
demand for multi-party elections, Kiên explicitly declared his aspirations 
for a multi-party system.163 Finally, his story drew public attention because 
of his immediate dismissal.  
In response to Kiên’s publication, the websites of the General Secretary 
and other political leaders published a number of counter-commentaries to 
Kiên’s article.164 While the commentaries admitted the wide attention drawn 
to his action, they focused on criticizing his arguments and, furthermore, 
denounced him as a “reactionary.” These responses by officials suggested 
that Kiên’s action was significant and also provided an example of a 
constitutional conversation between state actors and a social actor.  
The constitutional dialogue sparked by Kiên was later extended to 
include other social actors.  Several figures of the 72 group voiced to support 
Kiên. In a workshop in Hanoi on the role of media in the state’s 
policymaking process on February 27, 2013, Nguyễn Quang A, the leading 
figure of the group, urged “journalists as well as the entire society to support 
and protect by any possible means brave journalists like Nguyễn Đắc 
Kiên.”165 Võ Thị Hảo, another figure of the 72 group, a writer, who used to 
work for the Family & Society Newspaper, spoke to the Radio France 
Internationale, that she highly valued Kiên as he was an upright person, 
which, according to her, was “rare” in contemporary Vietnam. To her, the 
implication of this case was that Vietnamese leaders should familiarize 
themselves with public criticism and the practice of tolerating the freedom 
of speech.166  
 
 
163 Nguyễn Đắc Kiên, supra note 154.  
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27, 2013), 
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Kiên’s action received more support in online media, resulting in the 
online movement called the “Declaration of Free Citizens.” The Declaration 
was initiated by bloggers and members of Facebook and by March 29, 2013 
the movement was supported by around 10,000 signatures from both inside 
and outside of Vietnam.167 The Declaration strictly adhered to and called for 
support for Kiên’s declaration, which was widely disseminated on the 
Internet. It stated:  
We affirm that we have the right to make the above mentioned 
announcement and every Vietnamese has the same right to make such 
announcement. We affirm that we are exercising our basic human 
rights which are freedom of speech, freedom of thought. These rights 
are inherited to every human being upon their births and they are 
recognised and respected by Vietnamese people. These rights aren't 
given by the Vietnamese communist party therefore the communist 
party doesn't have the right to deny or to make any judgement of their 
meanings. Therefore we consider any judgment aiming at us as a 
violation of our rights. We condemn those who are against this right 
as reactionaries, and it is in contrary to the interest of our people and 
against the natural progress of human race.168 
By declaring these aspirations, what were the purposes of the “free 
citizens”? One of the initiators, Huỳnh Công Thuận, a blogger mobilizing 
for human rights in Ho Chi Minh City, attempted to explain those purposes 
in an interview with the Vietnamese branch of the Radio France 
Internationale.169 First, he asserted that the Declaration was meant to assert 
natural rights. The purpose of the “free citizens” in supporting the 
Declaration was to express their aspirations rather than to immediately bring 
about a constitutional revolution.170 Thuận stated that the initiators were 
motivated by Kiên’s declaration of his aspiration as a clear and popular 
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assertion of freedom of speech and freedom of thought.171 Thuận argued 
that every Vietnamese person has to right to declare their aspirations like 
Kiên. Furthermore, Thuận believed that it was for purposes of declaring 
their aspirations that the group of free citizens decided to release a 
declaration rather petition like the 72 group.172 Thuận argued that a 
declaration is the natural assertion of natural rights of human beings, while 
a petition merely represents the less passive demanding of something from 
the government.173  
Secondly, Thuận asserted that the Declaration was meant to foster the 
public’s awareness of their rights and the public’s audacity and capacity to 
become concerned with and ultimately to participate in discussing public 
affairs with the ultimate goal of putting some pressure on the government-
aligned constitution-makers.174 Furthermore, Thuận asserted that the 
numbers of signatures supporting the Declaration indicated that the people 
had overcome their fear of repression enough to concern themselves with 
and to discuss public affairs.175 He and the initiators are aware of the 
possible consequence of their actions, but they believe that the political 
environment in Vietnam had become more open than it had been in previous 
eras and that the government would therefore not arbitrarily punish them. 
Finally, he believed that the release of the Declaration on the Internet 
provided the Declaration with a venue which would allow it to sufficiently 
affect the ordinary people’s awareness of their rights and their concern for 
national issues.176 
In short, the “free citizens” appropriated their opportunity to play a role 
in constitution-making to mobilize their fellow citizens to assert their 
constitutional rights, to raise their awareness of constitutional values, and to 
participate in public deliberation on constitutional issues.  
F. The Letter of Catholic Bishops' Conference of Vietnam.  
Catholicism has had a contentious relationship with the communist 
government in Vietnam. As Samuel Gregg observes, “Marxist regimes are 
invariably hostile to religious belief.”177 One of the reasons for that hostility 
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is that Marxism is explicitly atheistic. Another reason is “the fact that some 
religions – such as Christianity – embody the insistence that there are 
inherent limits to state power,” which is in contrast to the communist 
government’s principle of providing for a “dictatorship of the 
proletariat.”178 There is also historical reason for the Vietnamese communist 
government’s treatment of Vietnam’s Catholic Church. “Vietnam’s rulers 
are acutely aware that Catholics were among the most committed anti-
Communist Vietnamese during the Vietnam War. Many Vietnamese also 
identified Catholicism with French colonial rule.”179 In recent years 
however, Catholic protests have played increasingly significant roles in 
society. “Thousands of Catholics have mounted peaceful public protests for 
almost a year.”180 Catholic activists have often focused on land rights as 
they believe that the Vietnamese communist government had confiscated 
church properties.181 
In 2013, when the regime undertook constitutional revision, Catholic 
activism, like other political activism, turned their attention to substantial 
political and constitutional questions. On March 1, 2013, priest Giuse 
Dương Hữu Tình presented a letter concerning constitutional revision by 
Catholic Bishops' Conference of Vietnam to the Constitutional Amendment 
Committee (hereinafter CBCV’s Letter).182 The Letter was considered “the 
most upright, publicized, and bravest” action of the Catholic Bishops as it 
touches the “mortal points” (such as removing Article 4 and Marxism from 
the Constitution) of the communist regime in Vietnam.183 The CBCV’s 
Letter addressed questions not only of freedom of religion, freedom of 
thought, and other civil freedoms, but also concerning the nature of the 
communist polity in Vietnam. The Letter included three parts concerning 
human rights, democracy, and political system. In each part, the Letter 
presented a conceptual background and then constitutional suggestions. The 
main points in the Letter can be summarized as follows:  
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First, the letter argued that Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh’s 
thoughts should not be established by the Constitution as the official 
ideology of the ruling party. The CBCV argues that the constitutional 
establishment of the communist ideology will limit the freedom of thought, 
freedom of speech, and other cultural rights. Moreover, as Marxism-
Leninism explicitly declares itself as atheistic, its establishment as a ruling 
ideology will not respect religious freedom. In addition, the letter argues 
that the practice of previous constitutions to practically cement an exclusive 
ideology into society has impeded the creative thinking of the Vietnamese 
people which, the letter argued, has been the cause for the backward 
circumstances in different aspects in Vietnam like science, technology, 
culture, and art. As an alternative, the CBCV proposed that the Vietnamese 
culture with its richness and diversity can be the intellectual foundation of 
the Vietnamese society.184  
Second, the letter stated that Constitution should provide a detailed base 
for protecting religious freedom. Accordingly, the Vietnamese people are 
not bound by any single religion or doctrine. The state should not denigrate 
religions and should not interfere in the internal affairs of religions, 
especially in areas such as education, the determination of which religious 
figures will be promoted within a religion’s hierarchy, and the transfer of 
religious persons between positions in a religious organization’s 
hierarchy.185  
Third, the letter held that the Constitution should not establish the 
leadership of any political parties, which therefore implied that Article 4 of 
the Constitution, which provides for the leadership of the Communist Party, 
ought to be removed. The CBCV’s argument is rooted in the principle of 
popular sovereignty. They argue that as the people are the true masters of 
power in the nation, they should be free to select their representatives and 
leaders through free and equal elections. Accordingly, the letter argues that 
assigning a constitutional mandate of leadership to the Communist Party 
will violate this democratic principle.186  
Fourth, the letter argued that the Constitution should provide for private 
ownership of lands consistent with the practices adopted in “most nations 
in the world.” The CBCV contended that the fact that the citizens do not 
have the right to private possession of lands has engendered serious social 
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inequality.187  
Finally, the letter posited that the Constitution should stipulate a clear 
separation of powers and establish the National Assembly as the real body 
of the supreme power. Accordingly, this suggestion is also related to the 
role of the Communist Party in a future Vietnamese government. The 
CBCV proposed that the Party should not interfere with the practice of the 
state power, and that the mandate of the leadership of the Communist Party 
should be removed because this mandate makes the National Assembly 
become a mere instrument of the Party rather the real owner of the supreme 
power.188  
It is said that the Letter has wide support among the Catholic 
community.189 Speaking to the Radio France Internationale, priest Phạm 
Trung Thành stated that: “Our priests are very happy…The parishioners we 
meet are also very happy.”190 He also said that in several churches in Ho 
Chi Minh City, such as Kỳ Đồng, Công Lý, Mẫu Tâm churches, the Letter 
was not only posted on the notice-boards but was also printed, distributed, 
and explained to the parishioners.191 The regime tolerated this Catholic 
activism without evident repressive reaction.192  
According to priest Phạm Trung Thành, the bishops were “careful and 
deliberate” in their addressing their “formal and publicized voice” 
concerning “the irrationality and the demands of human’s conscience about 
human rights.”193 He added: “The leaders of Vietnam Catholicism believe 
that this is a suitable moment to voice.”194 The moment of constitution-
making and the vibrant environment of social mobilization begun and 
developed by other intellectuals and activists inspired the Catholic bishops 
to express their own constitutional awareness and critical voices. Priest 
Phạm Trung Thành states that the most important thing about their Letter is 
that the bishops “speak according to their conscience, and recognize a 
truism in the regime, in the theory, and in the reality.”195 Thus, the Catholic 
bishops may expect some changes in the Constitution but their main concern 
 
 
187 Id.  
188 Id.  
189 Thanh Phương, Bản Góp ý Hiến pháp của Hội đồng Giám mục Việt Nam được ủng hộ rộng 
rãi [Catholic Bishops’s Constitutional Suggestions Receive Wide Support], RADIO FRANCE 
INTERNATIONALE (Mar. 18, 2013), http://vi.rfi.fr/viet-nam/20130318-ban-gop-y-hien-phap-cua-hoi-
dong-giam-muc-viet-nam-duoc-su-ung-ho-rong-rai. 
190 Id.   
191 Id.  
192 Id.  
193 Id.  
194 Id.  
195 Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
2018]    CONSTITUTIONAL MOBILIZATION       155 
 
 
 
 
in speaking out was, together with other social actors, to engage in a national 
constitutional dialogue so as to express their self-consciousness of and 
strongly critical attitude towards the perceived problems internal to the 
existing regime. 
G. The Civil Society’s Three Petitions 
On March 29, 2013, various representatives of various NGOs submitted 
to the Constitutional Amendment Committee three constitutional petitions. 
The first was submitted by seventeen social organizations working for the 
rights of seven vulnerable groups (namely ethnic groups, the disabled, 
migrant workers, HIV-positive persons, LGBT persons, women, and youth) 
[hereinafter, the 7G Petition).196 The second petition was submitted by 
thirty-five organizations of the Vietnamese civil society (hereinafter, the 
NGOs’ Petition).197 The third petition was submitted by an LGBT group 
(hereinafter, the LGBT Petition) known as the ICS Centre (Connection and 
Sharing).198 
These major constitutional mobilizations will be examined using details 
drawn primarily from my extensive interviews with a person, who I will not 
name here to protect that person from recrimination, who played the lead 
role in the civil society’s constitutional mobilizations and a former Director 
of the Institute for Studies of Society, Economics and Environment (iSEE), 
the umbrella under which the initiators of three constitutional petitions 
mentioned above worked together with him.199  
He told me that different organizations of the civil society had already 
expressed concern for legal reforms to better protect human rights 
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(especially with regards to the rights of the LGBT community, minority 
groups’ rights to land and cultural rights, and the rights of other vulnerable 
persons) and to promote the development of civil society in Vietnam.200 
Particularly important to the expression of concern for civil rights in 
Vietnam was the emergence of the LGBT movement. Vietnam has 
1,600,000 LGBT persons between the ages of 15-59.201 A recent empirical 
investigation states that: “the public visibility of LGBT peoples and LGBT 
civil society organizations has increased in Vietnam during the past five 
years. Millions of internet and social media users and a dozen large-line 
LGBT fora operate openly.”202 Despite the government’s restriction on 
peaceful assembly, Vietnam’s LGBT groups organized five gay pride 
parades in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016. 
 The 1992 Constitution explicitly stipulated male-female marriage, 
which is the base for the 2000 Marriage and Family Law’s rejection of 
same-sex marriage. But, in 2012, the state initiated an amendment to the 
Marriage and Family Law which included the consideration of same-sex 
marriage and, accordingly, “Vietnam became the first country in Asia where 
the topic has been discussed at the level of a national assembly.”203 LGBT 
activists participated in the amendment process of this law.204 In 2013, 
same-sex marriage became a constitutional question when the state planned 
to comprehensively revise the 1992 Constitution. LGBT activists sought to 
establish a constitutional basis for permitting same-sex marriage and 
extending other rights to LGBT persons. Therefore, in addition to 
participating in the joint petition of the seven vulnerable groups, the LGBT 
community released its own constitutional petition.   
According to the former iSEE leader, when the state initiated the plan 
for constitutional revision, different organizations of civil society 
recognized that the plan for constitutional revision presented a good 
opportunity for them to cooperate with each other in order to advocate for 
better constitutional protection of human rights.205 Those organizations 
thereby seized the opportunity of constitution-making to engage in 
constitutional mobilization. To mobilize for constitutional change, different 
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organizations and social groups decided to work together rather than 
separately in order to share resources, achieve greater security, and, 
ultimately, to realize greater impact.206 Cooperation was particularly 
important for achieving security for the parties engaging in activism as 
working together in a larger group made it harder for the government to 
punish them. 
Organizations and social groups worked assiduously from January to 
March of 2013 to prepare for their constitutional proposals. First, they 
invited constitutional scholars to talk to them about constitutional issues to 
gain necessary knowledge. The key invited scholars including Nguyễn 
Đăng Dung and Vũ Công Giao,207 who were also the major members of the 
CVHP group. 
Members of the organizations and social groups then held consultation 
meetings in different areas of Vietnam.208 They also invited journalists to 
follow them and report their work.209 To illustrate, from January 20 to 
March 7, 2013, social organizations working for the rights of seven 
vulnerable groups conducted 45 consultation meetings in 13 provinces with 
980 people from seven groups being involved. The details are as follows: 
(1) 132 people from ethic groups called H’mông, Dao, Giáy, Tày, Nùng, 
Thái, Xơ Đăng, Mường, Cao Lan participating in 5 consultation meetings 
held in Hà Nội, Yên Bái, Lào Cai, Lạng Sơn; (2) 203 youths participating 
in 7 consultation meetings held in Bắc Giang, Đắk Nông, Hanoi, Đà Nẵng, 
and Hồ Chí Minh City; (3) 294 women coming different places with 
different backgrounds and situations participated in 11 consultation 
meetings held in Hà Nội, Hòa Bình, Bắc Ninh, Nam Định, and Đắk Nông; 
(4) 84 HIV-positive people participating in 6 consultation meetings held in 
Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City; (5) 114 migrant workers including children 
participating in 8 consultation meetings held in Hà Nội; (6) 41 LGBT people 
participating in 3 consultation meetings held in Hanoi and Hồ Chí Minh 
City; (7) 115 disabled persons participating in 6 consultation meetings held 
in Hanoi, Thái Nguyên and Lạng Sơn.210 The ICS Center, which, again, was 
working for the rights of  LGBT people, conducted three deep interviews in 
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and collected 2,510 online supporting 
 
 
206 Id.  
207 Id.  
208 Id.  
209 Id.  
210 CVHP, supra note 121.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
158 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 17:113 
 
 
 
signatures on the petition from February 27 2013 to March 25, 2013.211  
To frame constitutional proposals, civil society actors mainly relied on 
transnational and international sources. These included comparative 
constitutional knowledge acquired from the invited constitutional law 
scholars. They also worked with these scholars to produce a basic handbook 
on constitution entitled ABC Về Hiến Pháp (ABC on the Constitution)212 
which they distributed to the members participating in drafting the 
constitutional proposals.213 The book introduced general concepts of 
constitutionalism, Vietnamese constitutions, foreign constitutional 
experiences, and key constitutional issues during the Vietnamese 
constitution-making process (such as human rights, a constitutional 
referendum, and judicial review).214 In addition, major international human 
rights treaties were distributed among the participants. Also notable was that 
one of the participants was a specialist on international human rights who 
helped train other members with knowledge on this field.215  
The central concern of the civil society was human rights, although they 
also considered other related institutional issues, like judicial review and a 
special body for human rights protection. This was due to their observation 
that vulnerable people are vulnerable to human rights abuse.216 The civil 
society actors focused on mobilizing for a universalist bill of rights 
consistent with international human rights standards, and they rejected the 
relativist view about human rights.217 But, different civil society actors 
focused on different human rights: the LGBT people were most concerned 
with the sexual rights; minority persons were most concerned with rights to 
use their mother language; students were most concerned with academic 
freedom.218 There were two main trends in their debates: some advocated 
for constitutional enumeration of detailed rights while others called for more 
general constitutional rights provisions that could sufficiently include 
specific rights. Different civil society actors had to reach to certain 
compromises and the generalist school was ultimately prevalent.219  
After consultation meetings and preparing the constitutional proposals, 
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the organizations and groups organized two conferences to discuss the 
proposals. Constitutional law scholars and several members of the National 
Assembly were also invited to attend these conferences.220 The meetings 
were reported by official media.221  
When the various Vietnamese human rights organizations and civil 
society groups worked in a large collective platform, they apparently felt 
more secure, but their unity also invited attempts to control them by the 
government. Vietnamese public security authorities closely followed the 
activities of the participating civil society groups.222 Journalists’ videos on 
the work of those civil society groups were examined by the authorities.223 
Media reporting on the work of the civil society groups were warned.224 
Authorities also made phone calls to the universities where there were 
students participating in the civil societies’ constitutional mobilization.225 
But, civil society actors believed that their actions were just and 
constructive, and they wanted to have a conversation with, rather than 
oppose the government.226 Ultimately, the three constitutional petitions 
were successfully submitted.  
The 7G Petition included three components: general aspirations, detailed 
suggestions on individual provisions in the draft constitution, and an 
appendix which described the empirical work of the groups. The Petition 
first articulated the groups’ “general aspirations” on the essential “spirit” of 
the new constitution. It emphasized that the Constitution must be rooted in 
the pluralist nature of the Vietnamese society which includes a variety of 
groups, communities, and nationalities. The petition called for the directive 
principle of the Constitution to consist of respecting the freedom of every 
individual and for the goal of the Constitution to be equality among citizens, 
groups, and communities. In addition, the petition called for the 
Constitution to recognize human rights in such a way as to be consistent 
with international human rights treaties signed by Vietnam. Moreover, the 
petition called for the Constitution to clearly define mechanisms to constrain 
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the state power and to protect vulnerable groups.227  
On this basis, the 7G Petition suggested incorporating the right to 
freedom of thought in order to both comply with the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (which Vietnam had already signed) and to 
continue with the pluralist development of different social strata.228 The 7G 
Petition also suggested removing the provision allowing restricting human 
rights for public interests as it argued that such a provision was inconsistent 
with international human rights standards. To protect human rights, the 7G 
Petition called for the creation of a national committee of human rights and 
a constitutional court.229 Although these bodies would mainly be concerned 
with constitutional protection of human rights, they would also be able to 
address more general and related questions. Finally, the 7G Petition called 
for redefining the nature and role of the Constitution such that its role would 
instead be to protect human rights, social equality, popular sovereignty, 
private ownership of land, popular ratification of the new constitution, and 
to constrain the public power.230 Several of the requests made by the 7G 
Petition were echoed in other constitutional petitions.  
For example, The NGOs’ Petition began with the criticism that the draft 
constitution failed to reflect the will of the people and of civil society, and 
that the draft could therefore not be a supreme law for a “democratic 
society” in Vietnam.231 The authors of the NGOs’ Petition were especially 
worried that the draft constitution lacked mechanisms to restrain the state 
power, thereby permitting the state to potentially issue legal instruments 
impeding the development of individuals and civil society.232  
On these grounds, the NGOs’ Petition first called for constitution-
making power to be granted to the people through a popular referendum on 
the new constitution.233 Second, NGOs’ Petition called for the principle of 
equality and indiscrimination to be applied in the constitution-making 
process.234 Specifically, the NGOs’ Petition called for the removal of the 
existing provision in the Constitution that stipulates that the sovereignty of 
the Vietnamese government is derived from particular social classes (the 
working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia) and the NGOs’ Petition 
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calls for that provision to be replaced with a popular sovereignty model.235 
Third, the NGOs’ Petition called for the Constitution to be free of provisions 
recognizing the roles of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and the Vietnam 
General Confederation of Labor (the two pro-party mass organizations) to 
ensure that there would be equality among different social associations. 
Fourth, the NGOs’ Petition called for the Constitution to be free of the 
provision permitting human rights restrictions so that the Constitution 
would comply with international human rights standards. Fifth, the NGOs’ 
Petition called for the Constitution to be free of state regulations that would 
permit the restriction of the freedom of speech and the freedom of 
association. Finally, the NGOs’ Petition called for the establishment of a 
national committee of human rights and a constitutional court.236 Thus, the 
NGOs’ Petition focused particularly on freedom of speech and freedom of 
association. This focus reflects the identity and values of the NGOs which 
submitted the NGOs’ Petition, but it is notable because it showed that the 
NGOs’ Petition shares many common elements with other petitions 
submitted by other mobilizing actors within Vietnam’s civil society and 
beyond.  
The LGBT’s Petition included three parts: (1) a general opinion on the 
“general spirit” of the Constitution; (2) specific petitions on two provisions 
in the draft constitution which would affect the rights of the LGBT people; 
and (3) an appendix which included 1,048 opinions from the LGBT 
community and the list of signatures.237 In the LGBT petitioners’ view, the 
“general spirit” of the Constitution must be such that the Constitution would 
be a document in which everybody, including LGBT persons, could find 
their “figure and rights.” The LGBT people persons were not petitioning for 
their specific rights but general human rights which would be sufficiently 
inclusive as to incorporate LGBT people’s rights.238 Their general strategy 
was that the Constitution should neutralize nomenclature regarding sex. 
On that ground, the LGBT Petition focused on two provisions of the draft 
constitution. They focused first on the provision concering gender equality, 
which provided for the equal rights of “male and female citizens” and 
prohibited discrimination on the base of “gender.” The LGBT Petition 
called for equal rights to instead be provided regardless of “gender and sex,” 
and for the Constitution to prohibit discrimination on the base of “gender, 
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sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity.”239 The LGBT Petition 
criticized the draft Constitution for its narrow protection of equality of 
“male and female citizens” as providing equal rights protection only on the 
base of biological status.240 To support their argument, the LGBT activists 
referred to General recommendations 28 to the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),241 
which Vietnam was a party to and which, according to their explanation, 
extended the scope of “women” to include the lesbian, bisexual, and 
transgender women.242  
The second provision the LGBT Petition criticized was the draft 
Constitution’s provision that “men and women” have the right to marriage. 
The LGBT Provision instead called for the constitutional recognition of 
marriage “between two persons,”243 which would mean creating a 
constitutional basis for same-sex marriage. To support its request, the LGBT 
Petition invoked the general human right to pursue happiness and argued 
that homosexual persons are human beings and must therefore have the right 
to live together in the institutional form of marriage to pursue their 
happiness. The LGBT Petition also referred to international experiences 
which suggested that, according to their data, eleven nations and territories 
had legalized same-sex marriage. To further buttress their argument, they 
invoked “scientific researches” which indicated that same-sex marriage 
would not destroy social, cultural, and familial values as normal 
apprehension.244  
Finally, the LGBT Petition called for a new constitutional provision 
which would provide for “the freedom to one’s body,” and “the right to 
change sex, name, and personality inconsistent with the body’s condition”, 
which was meant to protect transgender persons. LGBT activists argued for 
this provision along libertarian lines, arguing that an individual knows better 
than the government how to treat his or her body in the way that is good for 
his or her life.245 
Different from other constitutional activists and intellectuals, the LGBT 
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community focused on rights issues relating to their identity rather than 
radical issues concerning the nature of the regime. However, they connected 
their identity-based concerns to the general concerns of human rights. In 
their case, their human rights discourse was consistent with the universalist 
outlook adopted by other mobilizing actors. 
After drafting the petitions, actors of the various civil society groups 
approached the Constitutional Amendment Committee to submit their 
petitions. They had difficulties in approaching the Constitutional 
Amendment Committee, however. Several of their attempts to contact the 
constitution-makers to submit their petitions failed.246 The echo of Petition 
72 made constitution-makers hostile to additional popular constitutional 
petitions. But, eventually, the constitution-makers agreed to hold a formal 
meeting to receive the three constitutional petitions. The former iSEE leader 
said that this may have been because several members of the National 
Assembly attended their conferences, knew about their constructive and 
moderate activities, and persuaded the Constitutional Amendment 
Committee to meet with the various civil society groups behind the petitions 
to receive their petitions.247 Ultimately, because the civil society groups 
focused mainly on human rights248 rather than on fundamental institutional 
issues (especially the party leadership), the constitution-makers agreed to 
have a direct constitutional dialogue with the civil society groups submitting 
the various petitions. Unlike the calls for fundamental institutional changes 
which had previously been issued to challenge the existing regime, the call 
for a universalist bill of rights was more acceptable to the constitution-
makers because the adoption of a universalist bill of rights would be useful 
for promoting the international legitimacy of the communist regime without 
immediate deleterious effect on the regime.  
Therefore, delegates of the organizations and social groups had a chance 
to meet with the constitution-makers and to submit their petitions. In the 
original plan, those delegates would have merely met with some 
representatives of the Constitutional Amendment Committee in a separate 
room. However, when those delegates came to the National Assembly’s 
Office, the delegates were invited to meet with all the members of 
Constitutional Amendment Committee.249 The meeting was short, lasting 
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about fifteen minutes.250 In the meeting, the former iSEE leader underlined 
the necessity of a human rights committee, a constitutional referendum, 
equality, and indiscrimination.251 Mr. Phan Trung Lý, a representative of the 
Constitutional Amendment Committee thanked the civil society’s 
organizations and groups, and stated that: “The Committee highly values 
the assistance of the civil society’s organizations on collecting the people’s 
opinions [on the draft constitution]. We will consider the petitions and 
receive the people’s opinions.”252 
Why did the actors of civil society engage in constitutional mobilization? 
My interviews suggest that they had multiple goals, not merely formal 
constitutional change. First, they wanted to realize better constitutional 
protection of human rights.253 This explains why their constitutional 
petitions focused on constitutional rights provisions and human rights- 
protecting institutions. Second, they wanted to provide the forums for the 
citizens to participate in the constitution-making process.254 This means 
they were mobilizing the citizens to participate in a national, constitutional 
dialogue. Fourth, they wanted to disseminate and educate members of the 
civil society with knowledge about constitution, human rights and the rule 
of law.255 This explained many of their activities, including their 
organization of constitutional lectures, consultant meetings, conferences, 
their invitations to journalists to follow their work, and their distributions of 
constitutional materials and international human rights treaties. These 
activities were meant to raise social awareness of constitutional values. 
Finally, they wanted to elevate the position of civil society in Vietnam.256 
By working together in a large scale, discussing significant constitutional 
issues, submitting their petitions to the politicians, and making sure their 
work reported by mass media, they hoped to enhance their role in the 
Vietnamese society.  
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A. Constitutional Opportunity.  
Vietnamese courts do not provide an environment for effective 
constitutional mobilization because they are subordinate to political 
institutions and do not have judicial review power.257 Instead, it is the 
constitution-making process that offers the particular constitutional 
opportunity for social actors to mobilize for constitutional change in 
Vietnam. The Vietnamese state’s commitments to “comprehensive 
constitutional revision” and “no taboo”258 constitutional discussions during 
the constitutional consultation process allowed constitutional activists and 
intellectuals to launch constitutional proposals and to mobilize public 
support without apprehension of political sanctions.  
That particular constitutional opportunity was underpinned by the 
general environment. Most importantly, despite international criticisms,259 
commentators on Vietnamese politics noted “the proliferation of non-
governmental organizations and associations, the increasing freedom of the 
press and media due to the declining salience of state ideology, and the 
loosening of the state’s political control over society.”260 In addition, 
although under political control in paper, civil society in Vietnam proved 
itself to be vibrant and the space allowed for Vietnamese society to exercise 
its vibrancy was clearly significantly greater than in previous constitution-
making opportunities.261 This allowed the Vietnamese civil society groups 
to involve themselves in constitutional mobilization. 
Moreover, the rapidly expanded use of the Internet and social media and 
the state’s weak control over the use of those forms of expression also 
played a key role in creating the environment for constitutional mobilization 
in Vietnam. As Zachary Abuza documented in 2015: “Forty-four percent of 
the population, over 39 million people, are now online, making Vietnam the 
14th-largest Internet market in the world...It is estimated that over 60 
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percent of urbanites and suburbanites are connected.”262 Importantly, Mr. 
Abuza also noted that “the Internet is surprisingly freewheeling in 
Vietnam,” mainly because its growth “far outpaced the government’s ability 
to contain it technologically.”263 Actors involved in the Petition 72, for 
example, had created a blog only to have it blocked by the authorities. 
Instead of giving up though, the persons behind Petition 72 quickly created 
other blogs beyond the technological control of the authorities where 
Petition 72 was publicized. Accordingly, due to technological reasons, the 
authorities were unable to put a strong control on the Internet, especially 
YouTube and social media like Facebook and blogs where the social 
mobilization operates, during the most recent constitution-making 
opportunity. Social actors took their opportunities to employ online media 
to mobilize for social changes in Vietnam,264 and when the regime 
undertook constitution-making, they seized this opportunity and utilized 
cyberspace to mobilize for constitutional change. 
At the root of the constitutional environment is economic development 
in Vietnam. Constitutional Economics suggests that a connection exists 
between constitutional arrangement and economic performance.265 
Particularly, economic liberalization exerts a pressure in favor of 
constitutional liberalization. While nearly three decades of Đổi Mới 
(Renovation), the name of the program of economic reform introduced by 
the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1986, have resulted in speedy economic 
development in Vietnam, the borrowing of constitutional institutions from 
the former Soviet Union (by the Vietnamese authoritarian regime) has 
presented an impediment for continued economic development.266 
Consequently, the economy was stagnant around the 2010s, corruption was 
a worsening problem, and the government’s mismanagement of the 
economy was made apparent to the people, which challenged the 
sociological foundation of the legitimacy of communist rule in Vietnam.267 
This compelled Vietnamese political leaders to initiate a project of 
constitutional reform so that they and the public could engage in a 
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constitutional dialogue to exchange ideas and discuss reforming institutions.  
Economic development also explains the regime’s ability to appease 
civil society and thereby exert control over it through restrictions on the 
freedom of speech and the freedom of the press. However, economic growth 
also facilitated the creation new social groups and, ultimately, diversified 
social interests in Vietnam. For example, a new middle class emerged in 
Vietnam as the consequence of urbanization brought about by economic 
liberalization and industrialization.268 That middle class is adaptive to 
globalization, competent in foreign languages (especially English), 
receptive to global ideas, and skillful in using technological products and 
the Internet. In response to social dynamics and pluralism, the regime has 
been compelled to tolerate the autonomy of the civil society and their 
pluralist voices to a certain extent so that the regime can guarantee that the 
evolving civil society and their pluralist discourse will not go so far as to 
destroy the regime. For these purposes, the regime has also accommodated 
constitutional mobilization to the extent that the regime is confident to put 
a firm stop when necessary. 
B. Constitutional Frame.  
In section, I analyzed the actions of the social actors I described in detail 
above within my concept of constitutional frame. Vietnamese constitutional 
activists and intellectuals used the 1992 Constitution as a framework for 
addressing and drawing the public’s attention to the problems internal to the 
existing communist regime. Despite different forms of expression, social 
actors identified common constitutional problems rooted in the exclusive 
leadership of communist party, the concentration of state power, and the 
control of the state over human rights and economic resources, which are 
embodied in the 1992 Constitution. Accordingly, the first step to addressing 
the commonly cited issues of the middle class social actors has been to 
address the issues inherent in Vietnam’s intrinsically authoritarian 
constitution.  
To develop arguments for constitutional change, mobilizing actors 
referred to alternative sources. First, they referred to international and 
transnational ideas, norms, discourses, or symbols. For example, they 
frequently cited to support for their arguments in international human rights 
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law, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and The Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. They also 
invoked the amorphous pool of global constitutional ideas and institutions 
like social contract theory, limited government, human rights, and 
constitutional review. In addition, they referenced foreign constitutional 
experiences (e.g., constitutional convention, constitutional referendum, and 
same-sex marriage). To gain wider acceptance and support, social actors 
connected their arguments to general values of the civilizing world rather 
than specify experiences of a particular foreign nation. Second, the 
constitutional framing those social actors engage in is further framed within 
the national cultural richness, the local social diversity, and the popular 
aspirations of the Vietnamese people. This kind of nationalism helped 
consolidate the legitimacy of the constitutional arguments and draw public 
support.  Consequently, there was a dialogical interaction between global 
and local sources in framing constitutional arguments.  
Despite different expression, reasoning, and level of concern, mobilizing 
actors shared common proposals for constitutional changes as a response to 
their identification of common problems, including: popular sovereignty, 
democratic elections, constitutional referendum, universalist human rights, 
specific institutions to protect human rights (such as a constitutional court 
or council and a human rights committee), a clear distribution of state 
power, a market economy without the “leading role” of the state-owned 
enterprises, and multiple forms of land ownership including private 
ownership. 
To engage in a dialogue with authoritarian leaders, mobilizing actors 
aligned their constitutional arguments to the official constitutional 
language. The 1992 Constitution and the Vietnamese communist party’s 
constitutional rhetoric included ambiguous and contradictory language 
which lacked substantive meanings. This allowed social actors to construct 
substantive constitutional meanings and aligned them to the florid 
constitutional language, by which they challenged those in power in a 
dialogical way. To illustrate, the 1992 text included the ambiguous and 
broad language of “socialist rule of law state.” Social actors aligned to this 
language and called for its substantive elements, such as human rights and 
constitutional review. Moreover, they referred to the constitution’s 
provision that all powers belong to the people to mobilize for constitutional 
referendum. In addition, they invoked the contradictory constitutional 
confirmation of both the supreme position of the National Assembly and the 
leading role of the Party to call for curtailing the party power in favor of 
parliamentary supremacy. Apart from the existing constitution, social actors 
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also aligned to constitutional rhetoric expressed in the party’s documents 
and constitution-makers’ discourse. For example, the rhetoric of controlling 
the state power adopted by the Party in the 11th Convention in 2011269 and 
repeated by the constitution-makers, allowed social actors to better frame 
their argument about checks and balances and constitutional review.  
Even when framing constitutional arguments based on transnational 
sources, social actors also aligned to official constitutional language. In fact, 
Vietnamese leaders and constitution-makers also supported revising the 
constitutional human rights provision in order to be consistent with 
international human rights treaties Vietnam had signed.270 Social actors 
adjusted to this official commitment in framing their reformist 
constitutional arguments informed by transnational sources. By that, they 
engaged in a dialogue with the government to articulate the meaning of 
international law in a domestic context. This helped to enhance the 
legitimacy of their arguments and avoid political sanction.  
Some groups had specific constitutional concerns and they amplified 
particular constitutional arguments. The CVHP group, for example, 
included mainly educators, which explains why they are specifically 
concerned with the constitutional provisions for free schooling or the 
establishment of an official language. The Catholic bishops focused on 
freedom of thought and freedom of religion. The various vulnerable, 
minority groups underlined the importance of constitutional protections for 
diversity and equality among different social groups. The NGOs’ petition 
featured calls for constitutional protection for freedom of association. The 
petitions submitted by the various LGBT groups emphasized the 
constitutional recognition of gender, sex equality, and freedom of marriage. 
The amplification of the various constitutional frames reflected the 
collective identity of the mobilizing groups.  
On the other hand, mobilizing groups extended their own concerns to 
general national concerns, by which they engaged in the wider national 
constitutional dialogue. Consequently, social actors shared the same 
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national concerns beyond their individual identities. Even when they 
underlined specific constitutional arguments reflecting their individual 
identities, they were not demanding constitutional recognition of their 
specific identities but, rather, connecting their specific concern to a general 
concern of constitutional recognition.  The LGBT group, for example, did 
not argue for specific rights for gay persons but, rather, for broader 
constitutional rights sufficient to protect gay rights and those of other 
persons. 
C. Constitutional Resource 
The resources for constitutional mobilization in Vietnam are the 
communist political elites rather than judges. This stems from both the 
nature of the communist authoritarian regime in Vietnam and the Confucian 
tradition of meritocracy which lead to the public conceiving of political 
elites as the resource of social change.271 Therefore, social actors approach 
communist elites as a mobilization resource, most of whom are members of 
the Constitutional Amendment Committee. Social actors must therefore 
seek to mobilize the Vietnamese communist elites to engage in a national 
constitutional dialogue to change the communist constitutional system 
dialogically. As was demonstrated in the latest constitution-making 
opportunity, they do not call for violent revolution to overthrow the 
communist regime and to establish a fundamentally new constitutional 
system. Even the social actors who mobilize for multi-party system also 
place the Communist Party in the dialogical process of constitutional 
change. They suggest that the Communist Party should participate in the 
free elections to compete for political power. Vietnamese activists and 
intellectuals have also tried to avoid confrontational approaches to the 
existing power-holders. They avoid holding demonstrations or marches, as 
those forms of mobilization can be considered crimes of subversion of the 
regime, or of attempting to destroy the social order according to the 
Criminal Code.272 Instead, they use different dialogical methods to 
communicate and exchange with the political leaders and constitution-
makers, such as writing letters, making suggestions, issuing declarations, 
and submitting petitions.  
To maintain a dialogue with political elites, they Vietnamese social 
actors have avoided the creation of well-organized oppositional bodies 
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because this would invite strong political suppression. They instead employ 
a wide range of dialogical methods to connect with each other and with the 
public. For example, they have organized conferences, engaged in 
consultation, conducted and participated in interviews, conducted surveys 
to gauge public opinion, created online fora for the public to engage in 
national dialogue on constitutional questions, and they have collected online 
signatures of support. They have maintained amorphous networks, 
sometimes online, sometimes offline. Another example of this behavior is 
the CVHP group which, in addition to providing discursive platforms, 
created a website to operate as a shared cyberspace in which the works of 
all social actors could be presented. Although all of the constitutional 
activists and intellectuals are not connected as a single body, they are mostly 
aware of the work of their fellows, they know that they are mobilizing for 
relatively similar things, and they have inspired and cooperated with each 
other. 
D. Dialogical Constitutional Change.  
1. Constitutional Dialogue. 
Constitutional mobilization has successfully facilitated and consolidated 
a national constitutional dialogue in Vietnam. This is also the expected 
consequence of mobilizing actors, such as the 72 group and the CVHP 
group.273 Why do social actors expect a national constitutional dialogue 
while the state is undertaking public constitutional consultation? They are 
aware of that the authorities will channel the public constitutional 
consultation to certain directions, which may lead to a constitutional 
monologue with only official voices.274 Therefore, they create alternative 
public venues for the public to openly discuss constitutional questions and 
exchange their pluralist views with each other and with the authorities.  
Social actors have successfully broadened the scope of the constitutional 
discussions beyond the official agenda of constitution-making, drawn 
considerable public attention, gained the support of thousands of people, 
and mobilized the public engagement in an unprecedentedly open national 
constitutional dialogue. The constitutional questions that have been 
vehemently, controversially, and publicly debated at national level had not 
been previously anticipated in the constitution-making agenda. Political 
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leadership and constitution-makers did not establish the following issues in 
the formal agenda: the establishment of a multi-party system, the separation 
of powers between branches of government, the adoption of a constitution 
through a constitutional referendum, a military loyal to the constitution 
rather than the Communist party, and private ownership of land. The agenda 
for constitution-making prepared by the constitution-makers anticipated 
some possible changes to the technique of constitution-writing, some 
conceptions, and some institutional details, and it also made clear that there 
would be no substantial changes concerning the above fundamental 
issues.275 Contrary to the wishes of the constitution-makers, these issues 
became central to the public constitutional debate,276  mainly due to the 
impact of constitutional mobilization.  
The government controls but accommodates the existence of the 
vehement constitutional mobilization. The government positively 
responded to the call for extending the time of public comments on the draft 
constitution beyond its original established date. In original the plan, the 
time for public comments on the draft constitution was three months: from 
January 2 to March 31, 2013. In response to the call for an extension, the 
constitution-makers allowed public constitutional discussion and 
suggestions until September 30, 2013.277  
Consequently, there was an unusual focus on constitutional issues 
among the Vietnamese people in 2013. In that year, the Vietnamese people 
experienced a “constitutional moment,” to borrow Ackerman’s 
phraseology, “a high degree of salience, engagement, mobilization, energy, 
and concern.”278 Constitutional mobilization exploded. The national 
discourse in mass media was unusually focused on constitutional questions. 
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The social energy and concern for constitutional questions was 
considerable: within three months, there were 26,091,276 popular 
constitutional submissions, and 28,149 conferences, workshops, and 
seminars on the draft Constitution.279 To be sure, the opportunity of 
constitution-making and the constitutional consultation process drew the 
public attention and initiated a constitutional dialogue. However, political 
control of this process and censorship of public discourse would have 
limited the dialogue. In this context, constitutional mobilization was 
instrumental to facilitating the dialogue by extending the public attention, 
broadening the scope of constitutional debate, and encouraging the public 
to engage in an open constitutional conversation with institutional actors.  
Importantly, based on what happened in Vietnam, constitutional 
mobilization is forceful enough to compel a government to engage in the 
national constitutional dialogue with the mobilizing actors and the public at 
large to discuss and express its critical views on the questions that are not 
officially anticipated. In Vietnam, top political leaders, like the General 
Secretary, appeared in the public to express critical positions on the 
mobilized constitutional proposals. In closed meetings, the Constitutional 
Amendment Committee also discussed the issues raised by mobilizing 
actors.280 In the open sessions of National Assembly, law-makers and 
constitution-makers concentrated their energy on discussing not only the 
issues established in the agenda but also the fundamental questions raised 
and mobilized by social actors.281 “Party-scholars” appeared often in the 
television news to criticize the public constitutional petitions. Newspapers 
controlled by the party or the state like Quân đội Nhân dân [People’s Army], 
Công an Nhân dân [People ‘s Police], Đại đoàn Kết [Great Solidarity], Tạp 
chí Cộng Sản [Communist Review], and Báo Nhân dân [People Newspaper] 
published a number of articles criticizing the mobilized constitutional 
proposals. However, despite the pressure a government hostile to 
constitutional reform can put on the proponents of constitutional reform, it 
can only do so after engaging in a critical conversation with the public and 
the mobilizing actors. Thus, despite resistance from a government hostile to 
constitutional reform, constitutional mobilization may at least facilitate a 
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national constitutional dialogue despite this mobilization and dialogue 
being controlled by the government.  
2. The Failure of Revolutionary Change. 
Ultimately, it’s important to remember that Vietnam’s 2013 Constitution 
rejected a revolutionary change. Constitution-makers ultimately rejected the 
call for a constitutional referendum and the Constitution was instead enacted 
by the National Assembly, the ordinary legislature. Constitution-makers did 
realize the potential positive effects of popular vote on the Constitution in 
that they believed it could consolidate social consensus and gain more social 
acceptance and that it would even have “international value.”282 But, a 
constitutional referendum was rejected on the basis that it would just allow 
the people to vote on the final constitution without public deliberation of 
substantive constitutional questions.283 In response to the argument that the 
Constitution must express the popular will and therefore must be ratified by 
the people, constitution-makers explained that the National Assembly 
represents the people and has legitimate power to approve the 
Constitution.284 There may be some basis to these explanations other than 
self-interest, but the crucial point was that as the process of constitutional 
mobilization had already been so forceful, a referendum may have only 
created a further constitutional opportunity for the social actors to mobilize 
for a constitutional revolution, the least attractive consequence for the 
existing political leaders. The Vietnamese government may have reasoned 
that it could exercise firm control over the public constitutional discourse 
and mobilization, but that it might have lost control over a constitutional 
referendum.  
With regards to substantive aspects, the constitution rejected the calls for 
radical changes, including the establishment of a multi-party system, a 
separated government, and a military loyal to the constitution rather than a 
particular party. These proposals would have attacked essential 
cornerstones protecting the establishment of powerful national elites. 
Vietnamese political leaders may envisage different constitutional visions, 
but they are unanimous in protecting core values of the socialist regime. 285 
Although the state planned to revise the Constitution comprehensively, 
there was no intention of having a constitutional revolution. Instead, 
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political elites wanted to have a new charter for the implementation of 
socialism in Vietnam to match a new global era.286 Therefore, political 
leadership may have tolerated a “no taboo” constitutional discussion to 
buttress the sociological foundation of the political legitimacy but would 
not constitutionalize ideas and institutions that had the potential to damage 
the existing regime. 
Another explanation of the failure of revolutionary constitutional change 
concerns the weakness of the mobilizing actors. In fact, constitutional 
mobilization in Vietnam was elite-led and lacked the sustaining 
participation of a public at large. As Vietnamese constitutional revision was 
not revolutionary, it did not necessarily involve mass mobilization.287 
Moreover, the social mobilization was not sustained by a strong middle 
class. Classical thinkers like Aristotle and contemporary thinkers like 
Francis Fukuyama have underlined the importance of the balance between 
the middle class and other social classes in creating substantial social 
change.288 Although the middle class has emerged in Vietnam, with their 
population of 12 million by 2012 in the nation of 90 million people,289 they 
are not a large and powerful enough group to sustain mass mobilization for 
a revolutionary constitutional change. Given this weakness and the given 
the power of the political elites, social actors did not expect that their 
mobilization can result in a revolutionary constitutional change.290  
3. Reformative Constitutional Change.  
The 2013 Constitution ultimately rejected the calls for revolutionary 
change but adopted reformative changes. However, partly because of the 
constitutional mobilization process that occurred during the drafting of the 
2013 Constitution, the constitution ultimately recognized in its preamble 
that the people were the authors of the constitution and stipulated that direct 
democracy (Article 6) and constitutional referendums would be the avenue 
for future constitutional amendment (Article 120); required the Communist 
Party to operate within the framework of the constitution, be accountable to 
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the public, and be subjected to public oversight (Article 4); established the 
principle of mutual control among the state branches (Article 2); provided 
for equality, cooperation, and competition among all economic sectors; and 
provided for wider rights to use lands.291 In addition, the Constitution re-
expressed existing constitutional rights in a more universalist manner and 
included eight new human rights (namely, the right to life, right not be 
expelled from home territory, right to private family life, presumption of 
innocence, right to appeal to higher court, right to favorable working 
conditions, prohibition of child labor, and the right to healthy environment). 
Constitution-makers believed that the new Constitution creates new 
conditions for reforms in Vietnam.292 
Because of the extent to which the demands of the mobilizing actors 
were responded to in the 2013 constitution, some actors of the civil society 
have had rather positive responses to the new Constitution.293 But, other 
social actors were disappointed by the Constitution because other expected 
reformative constitutional changes were rejected at the last moment, such 
as the introduction of a constitutional review body, removing the “leading 
role” of the state-owned enterprises, and recognizing private ownership of 
land.294 Although the adoption of these reform proposals would not result in 
a fundamental change of the regime, they may have challenged traditional 
socialist values. For example, the creation of a constitutional review body 
would have contradicted the socialist principle of legislative supremacy.295 
Similarly, the state’s control of economic resources is the guarantee for 
implementation of socialist policies. 
Although the national constitutional dialogue did not result in a 
constitutional revolution, it operated as the forum for political elites and the 
people, including mobilizing actors, to negotiate and compromise on 
constitutional questions. While political elites ultimately refused to 
implement fundamental changes, they did at least adapt the existing socialist 
constitutional system to respond to popular demands such as committing to 
future constitutional referendums, providing for the party’s accountability 
to the public, and for providing greater protections for universal human 
rights. Because these reformative constitutional changes exist in tension 
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with socialist constitutional values adopted in the same Constitution, the 
2013 Constitution provides a wide space for incremental, reformative 
constitutional change in Vietnam.  
4. Cultural Constitutional Change. 
In addition to reformative changes, the constitutional dialogue realized 
in 2013 was constructive in that it helped to change the constitutional culture 
in Vietnam. To begin with, the actual occurrence of a national constitutional 
dialogue is itself a considerable change in constitutional culture. The 
authoritarian government in Vietnam had been conventionally suppressive 
to public criticisms of the regime. Even in the 2001 constitutional debate 
(which had been relatively open),296 issues of providing for a multi-party 
system, the separation of powers, or constitutional courts were still taboos 
in constitutional discourse. The 2013 constitutional debates demonstrated 
significant changes compared to the 2001 debates. Political leaders 
instructed constitution-makers to receive and even consider opposing 
opinions.297 Constitution-makers were responsive and respectful to 
opposing constitutional petitions.298 Rather than banning the critical 
discussions and putting the activists into jail for crimes of subversion, 
Vietnamese political leaders not only allowed constitutional activists and 
intellectuals to seriously question the constitutional legitimacy of the 
regime, but also allowed for engagement in dialogue with them and the 
public. This dialogical culture demonstrates a more civilized way in which 
a government may treat its citizens and activists in constitutional matters.  
Moreover, the constitutional dialogue in 2013 considerably changed the 
popular constitutional culture, and also the expected consequences of many 
mobilizing actors.299 First, the dialogue allowed the social actors to actually 
realize their constitutional rights to political participation, which also helped 
to train the public in democratic practices, habits, and culture. Second, the 
dialogue raised the public’s awareness of the role of the Constitution 
(especially its rights provisions). In Vietnam, as the Constitution is not 
judicially enforced, it had little place in the public mind. The 2013 
mobilized constitutional dialogue changed that picture. Bùi Đức Lại, 
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member of the CVHP group, observed: “In the whole year of constitutional 
mobilization, social awareness has a new development.”300 Several 
members of the National Assembly and the constitution-makers also told 
me that after the adoption of the new Constitution, the citizens are more 
aware of the relevance of the Constitution and even began to cite the 
Constitution to argue against state actions.301 Third, the dialogue operated 
as the venue for social actors to raise the popular awareness of the problems 
internal to the existing constitutional order. Fourth, it helped social actors to 
envisage and raise the public awareness of normative constitutionalist 
values. For example, according to the former iSEE leader, the participation 
of the civil society groups and organizations in the constitution-making 
process through constitutional petitions helped to increase their human 
rights awareness.302 
The public exposition and awareness of the role of the Constitution, 
constitutional problems and values in the long run may push the people to 
engage in more constitutional mobilization, which may result in further 
incremental constitutional change. Social mobilization cannot create 
constitutional change overnight. Even in the United States it also took 
decades for social movements to change constitutional norms.303 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has introduced the phenomenon and concept of 
constitutional mobilization, offered some theories as to how it works in 
practice, and offered the case-study of Vietnam’s 2013 constitution drafting 
as an example of constitutional mobilization. I conclude with further 
reflections. To begin with, this study has important implications for China. 
Despite having a similar communist regime, the Chinese citizens’ 
experiences with constitutional mobilization and particularly the responses 
of the Chinese government to Chinese attempts at constitutional 
mobilization have been considerably different. I argue that the lack of an 
opportunity for constitution-making in China is due in significant part to 
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Chinese constitutional exceptionalism which has prevented social actors in 
China from mobilizing a national constitutional dialogue as their 
Vietnamese counterparts did.304 
More generally, I proposed that constitutional mobilization can be 
established as a new area of comparative constitutional inquiry. This is the 
area of empirical rather than normative inquiry, drawing on the fact that 
constitutional mobilization is an ubiquitous reality. This area is directive to 
the epistemology of the social foundation of constitutional government. 
Accordingly, the dynamics of constitutional law are situated within a more 
general context of contentious socio-political relations with discursive 
venues for resistance, contestation, and mobilization.305 Studies of 
constitutional mobilization depart from juricentrism and textualism 
although they should not ignore courts, constitutional litigation, and 
constitutional texts. Courts and texts are situated within the complex 
relationship with social dynamics.  
Studies of constitutional mobilization are an interdisciplinary area which 
should consider a variety of complex local and global factors which explain 
how and why social actors mobilize for constitutional change. Global 
factors include globalization, international law, transnational social 
movements, transnational social networks, and others. Local factors 
concern the economic, social, and political condition, constitutional 
arrangement, traditional culture, social structure, ideology, community 
identity, and intellectual environment, among others.  In particular, 
constitutional mobilization must be situated within a particular 
constitutional arrangement in different political regimes. Due to the 
institutional and social embeddedness of constitutional mobilization, and 
the variety of constitutional opportunities, frames, resources, and changes, 
case-study exploration and contextual theorization are useful for studying 
constitutional mobilizations.   
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